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INTRODUCTION 
Lynn Stout heartily embraced heterodox economic theories 
for describing capital markets and a progressive zeal for re-
forming them.  Yet when she came to formulate her policy pre-
scriptions for financial markets, one of the most prominent 
progressive corporate and financial law scholars of the twenti-
eth century could sometimes take these twin intellectual en-
gines into surprisingly “conservative” waters.  Lynn’s landmark 
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1999 article in the Duke Law Journal, “Why the Law Hates 
Speculators” provides an example of her coming to the unex-
pected policy conclusions of returning to ancient solutions to 
the problems of modern financial markets.1  She advocated for 
identifying and reducing excessive financial speculation in de-
rivatives markets by reviving the common law doctrine of in-
surable interest.2 
This Article explores how a similar intellectual move—re-
turning to common law or traditional approaches to financial 
institution governance—can inform and improve a range of fi-
nancial reforms.  In particular, this Article seeks to revive the 
use of organizational form as a tool of financial regulation. 
Very old varietals, including partnerships and mutual compa-
nies, decanted in new bottles can promote financial stability, 
lower incentives for excessive risk-taking by financial in-
termediaries, provide mechanisms to police their market con-
duct, and better align their incentives with the interests of their 
customers and consumers. 
In arguing for the use of organizational form as a regula-
tory tool, this Article examines a common but somewhat hid-
den thread running through a range of innovative, 
contemporary scholarship on financial regulation.  In a num-
ber of works, both the contemporaries and intellectual heirs of 
Professor Stout have explored ways to “remutualize” ownership 
of financial intermediaries.  For instance, Professors Claire Hill 
and Richard Painter argue that reintroducing elements of the 
old partnership structure of investment banks would curb ex-
cessive risk-taking by, and change the culture of, those impor-
tant financial intermediaries.3  Professor Saule Omarova moves 
from the level of the firm to the level of industry and argues for 
a self-regulatory legal regime in which large financial institu-
tions would collectively bear the costs of systemically risky ac-
1 Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private 
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 777–78 (1999). 
2 Id. at 777–82.  Under this doctrine, insurance and, in turn, derivative 
contracts are only legally enforceable if at least one of the parties uses the con-
tract to transfer or hedge a preexisting risk. Id. at 725.  If the contract involves the 
transfer of risks to which neither counterparty was subject before the bargain was 
struck, then courts would not enforce the agreement. Id. at 724–27.  The opera-
tion of this rule can be seen in a simple example: the common law would not 
enforce a contract in which one person purchases fire insurance for a neighbor’s 
house. 
3 See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: 
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 146–48 (2015). 
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tivities and thus police each other’s behavior.4  Her ideas 
harken back to historical structures in which exchanges were 
mutually owned and regulated by the brokers who traded on 
them.5  It also recalls how the organizational form used to oper-
ate on an industry-wide level: in the nineteenth century, large 
banks formed clearinghouses that provided a form of deposit 
insurance to one another and helped a large swath of the finan-
cial sector withstand banking panics.6  Professor Paolo 
Saguato examines a different, modern version of clearing-
houses: entities that facilitate the clearing and settlements of 
trillions of dollars of securities and derivatives trades each 
day.7  Modern clearinghouses, or clearing companies, reduce 
risk to parties to these transactions and to the entire financial 
system by serving as central counterparties to trades.8  Profes-
sor Saguato argues that the demutualization of clearinghouses 
results in their shareholders having incentives to increase the 
risk profile of these entities at the expense of both members 
(i.e., the financial institutions using the company to clear and 
settle trades) and the entire financial system.9  He proposes 
various mechanisms to give control of clearing company risk-
taking back to the members/users, who have the ultimate risk 
exposure.10 
Still other scholars examine the way in which credit unions 
and other financial cooperatives tend to offer loans and other 
financial products with more favorable and less exploitative 
terms to borrowers and consumers.11  Older works by Profes-
sor Henry Hansmann and others demonstrate that mutually 
owned banks and other lenders tend to make less risky invest-
4 See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as a Community of Fate: Toward Finan-
cial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 419–20 (2011). 
5 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Impli-
cations of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 
403–07 (2002) (tracing legislative and regulatory history of stock exchange 
demutualization in the United States). 
6 Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the 
United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 277, 282–83 (1985). 
7 Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” 
Is Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 601 
(2017). 
8 Id. at 601, 603–05. 
9 Id. at 642–46. 
10 Id. at 659–65. 
11 See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Own-
ership, 105 J. PUB. ECON. 39, 46 (2013) (finding that credit unions have lower 
purchase and default annual percentage rates and lower late and over-the-limit 
fees than investor-owned issuers). 
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ments and run a lower risk of failure.12  In life insurance, mu-
tual companies tend to have much more conservative financial 
reserve practices than their investor-owned counterparts.13 
Common threads unite these different strands of scholar-
ship.  Each of these scholars argues that the organizational 
form that a financial institution takes matters intensively for 
one or more of the following policy concerns: the institution’s 
risk-taking; the risk of financial failure; and consumer protec-
tion.  Each of these strands of scholarship examines how an 
organizational form other than the investor-owned corporation 
may further one or more of these policy objectives.  An alterna-
tive entity form may lower the risk that a financial institution 
would: fail and thus impose costs on investors, customers, or 
the financial system;14 break laws or commit misconduct;15 or 
exploit customers or consumers.16 
Alternative entities—partnerships,17 mutuals,18 and coop-
eratives19—offer one or more of these policy advantages over 
the investor-owned corporation by changing the basic relation-
ship between a firm’s owners and its management.  Some of the 
aforementioned scholarship focuses on changes in control 
rights or liability rules with respect to the entity.  For example, 
12 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 249–50, 255–57 
(2000). 
13 See id. at 267–70. 
14 By lowering the risk that a financial institution will fail, an alternative 
entity form may also mitigate systemic risk, i.e., lower the incidence and severity 
of financial crises; the failure of financial institution triggering the failure of other 
institutions represents one channel for systemic risk to propagate. George G. 
Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators 
Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 372–73 (2003) (describing how 
systemic risk may arise from chain reaction of financial institution failures).  How-
ever, even financial firms organized as partnerships or mutuals may not consider 
the full systemic risk implications of their failure in their decisions to take risks as 
some of the costs of their failure are externalized on other firms or the entire 
financial system. 
15 See, e.g., Andrew Park, The Endless Cycle of Corporate Crime and Why It’s 
So Hard to Stop, DUKE LAW NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://law.duke.edu/news/ 
endless-cycle-corporate-crime-and-why-its-so-hard-stop/ [https://perma.cc/ 
T88V-YZNK] (“In scandal after scandal . . . big corporations or their employees are 
found to be flouting laws, often at the expense of consumers or investors.”). 
16 See, e.g., Luke Landes, Mutual Vs. Public Insurance Companies, CONSUMER-
ISM  COMMENTARY (July 31, 2019), https://www.consumerismcommentary.com/ 
mutual-vs-public-insurance-companies/ [https://perma.cc/37FB-ZCWG] (last 
updated July 31, 2018). 
17 Partnership, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A voluntary associa-
tion of two or more persons who jointly own and carry on a business for profit.”). 
18 Mutual Company, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A company that 
is owned by its customers rather than by a separate group of stockholders.”). 
19 Cooperative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An organization or 
enterprise (as a store) owned by those who use its services.”). 
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Professors Hill and Painter write on the benefits that come with 
an investment bank partnership: personal liability chastens 
the risk-taking of partners and gives them the incentive and 
tools to monitor and exercise control over the actions of their 
co-owners.20  However, the benefits of alternative entity forms 
flow from more than just the rules surrounding liability and 
control rights.  After all, in many modern partnerships, mutu-
als, and cooperatives, control is delegated to a small cadre of 
managers21 and the personal liability of owners in many forms 
such as mutuals remains limited.22  Alternative entity forms 
exert a profound and often socially beneficial influence on the 
behavior of these managers by changing the identity of the 
residual claimant of the firm.23  Even if a firm’s residual claim-
ant—–the economic actor or actors entitled to the firm’s net 
cash flows after all debts and other claims have been paid24— 
has weak levers to control management, management has no 
other claimants to whom it is ultimately beholden.  This can 
dramatically reorient management’s incentives and refashion 
its culture.  Management in an investor-owned corporation 
faces strong pressures to serve profit-seeking shareholders 
with potentially no other ties to the firm.25  Management of a 
corporation may follow the norm of shareholder wealth max-
imization.26  By contrast, management of partnerships, mutu-
als, and cooperatives are ultimately responsible to altogether 
different constituents: employees or producers (as is the case 
with investment banking partnerships) or consumers (as with 
mutual or cooperative banks and insurance companies).27 
20 See infra section I.A. 
21 For example, Professors Hill and Painter highlight the role that executive 
committees played in governing the old investment banking partnerships. HILL & 
PAINTER, supra note 3, at 101. 
22 For example, state statutes typically limit the liability of policyholders in a 
mutual insurance company to payment of premiums specified in the policy. E.g., 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-218 (2019). 
23 See Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Cor-
porate Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 351, 356–60 (1983). 
24 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Con-
trol, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983). 
25 Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 9–13 (2010). 
26 Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and its Implemen-
tation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2014). 
27 This explanation tracks Henry Hansmann’s work, which sees the identity 
of the residual claimant as central to the behavior of alternative entities such as 
mutuals and cooperatives.  Hansmann explains the importance of the identity of 
the residual claimants compared to control rights in the following passage: 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 7 28-JUL-20 17:16
R
R
803 2020] REMUTUALIZATION 
The organizational form, and particularly alternatives to 
investor-owned corporations, represents a potentially powerful 
but forgotten tool in the regulatory arsenal.  Redefining who 
bears liability for a firm’s debts in the case of its insolvency, 
who the firm’s residual claimant is, and who exercises control 
and how that control is exercised, can profoundly alter a firm’s 
risk-taking and treatment of consumers.28  Moreover, the orga-
nizational form as a regulatory tool offers advantages over ex-
isting financial regulation.  It engages firm owners, and not just 
government regulators, in policing risk-taking, market con-
duct, and legal compliance.29  It also offers governance mecha-
nisms that are more time-tested than many recent novel 
proposals that seek to expand the fiduciary duties of directors 
and officers, whether in terms of the duties owed, which per-
sons owe the duties, and to whom those duties run.30 
Deploying the set of tools offered by remutualization re-
quires careful consideration not only of the benefits but also of 
the costs.  Chief among those costs are the difficulties that 
alternative entity forms would face in raising large amounts of 
capital and expanding the scope and complexity of their opera-
tions.31  However, this might prove to be a virtue.  Investment 
banks reverting to partnership form or large lenders or insur-
ance companies remutualizing would create checks on the size 
and complexity of these financial institutions.  The organiza-
tional form would serve as an alternative to breaking up large 
financial institutions to address “Too-Big-To-Fail” and related 
concerns.32  In this sense, remutualization bears a strong re-
semblance to Professor Stout’s proposal on derivatives, as re-
[B]y virtue of their ownership, the patrons are assured that there is 
no other group of owners to whom management is responsive.  It is 
one thing to transact with a firm whose firm whose managers are 
nominally your agents but are not much subject to your control; it is 
another to transact with a firm whose managers are actively serving 
owners who have an interest clearly adverse to yours. 
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48. 
28 See id. at 255–56, 269–70. 
29 See infra section IV.C. 
30 For a review and critique of corporate governance proposals to address 
systemic risk, particularly proposals involving modifying fiduciary duties of bank 
directors and officers, see Robert C. Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1107–10 (2017). 
31 See infra section IV.A.3; HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273–74. 
32 For a primer on the “Too-Big-To-Fail” problem and an argument that the 
Dodd-Frank Act did not solve it, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: 
A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 
951 (2011). 
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quiring an “insurable interest” would curb the volume of 
derivatives.33 
At the same time and by contrast, mutuals may face con-
flicts among residual claimants when a firm offers very differ-
ent financial products.34  Mutual companies work best for their 
owners, when those owners have homogenous interests.  Ho-
mogeneity reduces conflict among residual claimants.35  The 
potential comparative advantages of an investor-owned corpo-
ration, however, must be weighed against its costs both to cus-
tomers and financial markets as described in this Article. 
There are also overarching risks of financial institutions con-
glomerating and offering products and services across multiple 
financial sectors.36 
Some scholars have described the agency costs faced by 
owners of partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives who have 
limited effective ability to control management.  However, 
mutuals, cooperatives, and partnerships address agency costs 
in a subtler way beyond control rights.  As explained below, 
changing the identity of the residual claimant of the firm en-
sures that management will not prioritize the interests of any 
other claimant above the owners, particularly those of profit-
seeking investors.37  Moreover, evidence from the insurance 
industry suggests the agency cost concerns associated with 
mutuals are muted; in many studies, mutual firms do not suf-
fer from worse financial performance or charge higher prices 
than their investor-owned counterparts.38 
Professor Hansmann provides a valuable framework for 
thinking about which stakeholders should optimally own a firm 
and toward what form of ownership firms in any given industry 
tend to gravitate.  Financial firms, like any other firm, have 
33 After the global financial crisis, Professor Stout revisited her Duke Law 
Journal article and argued that her earlier policy proposals would reduce both the 
size of the mushrooming derivatives market and systemic risk. See, e.g., Lynn A. 
Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, REGULATION, Fall 2009, at 
30, 33 (suggesting a return to “common-law rule against difference contracts” to 
counteract “speculation [that] drives the OTC [(“over the counter”)] derivative mar-
kets” and increases systemic risk).  In this Article, Professor Stout cited a startling 
statistic: at the end of 2008, when the financial crisis was peaking, the notional 
value of all credit default swaps, a derivative used to hedge the credit risk of bonds 
was $67 trillion, while “the total market value of all the underlying bonds issued 
by U.S. companies outstanding was only $15 trillion.” Id. 
34 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 263, 283–84 (stressing the “importance of 
homogeneity of interest among the members of a mutual company”). 
35 Id. 
36 See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
37 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48. 
38 See infra notes 148–65 and accompanying text. 
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multiple “patrons,” including employees/producers, capital 
providers, customers, suppliers, purchasers, and other 
counterparties.  A firm could be owned by any one of these 
types of patrons.  Owners might be: 
• investors whose primary role is to supply capital and 
whose main interest in the firm are investment returns; 
• employees or producers (as is the case with investment 
banks in the past and law firm partnerships up to the 
current day); 
• customers (for example, in mutual banks or insurance 
companies); or 
• counterparties in an industry (as with members of the old 
banking or modern securities/derivative clearinghouse).39 
In Professor Hansmann’s framework, any choice of entity 
has two sets of costs associated with it: 
Market contracting costs: the costs of patrons who do not 
have ownership rights over the firm who must contract with 
the firm in the marketplace; and 
The ownership costs of the patrons that do have those 
rights.40 
This framework comes straight from the established “theory of 
the firm” literature.41  Professor Hansmann theorizes that the 
optimal form of entity is one that minimizes the sum of market 
contracting and ownership costs.42  Over time, firms in an in-
dustry may gravitate towards the optimal form, e.g., toward 
investor- or mutually owned firms. 
This Article explores whether modern investment banks, 
commercial banks, insurance companies, and firms within a 
financial industry sector as a collective impose too high mar-
ket-contracting costs on a wide set of patrons of the firm.  To 
the extent that customers, consumers, and counterparties of 
firms in a particular financial services sector cannot ade-
quately protect their interests via contract—whether due to 
asymmetric information with respect to the products and ser-
vices being offered, behavioral biases, or market structures— 
39 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 46–49. 
40 See id. at 48 (discussing both costs of market contracting and costs of 
ownership). 
41 Id. at 19–20. 
42 Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 273 
(1988) (“Efficiency will be best served if ownership is assigned [s]o that total 
transaction costs for all patrons are minimized. This means minimizing the sum 
of both the costs of market contracting for those patrons who are not owners, and 
the costs of ownership for the class of patrons who are assigned ownership.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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some version of partnership, mutual, or cooperative may be-
come increasingly attractive in terms of net social benefits.43 
Furthermore, when the behavior—and notably the insol-
vency—of a particular type of financial firm imposes significant 
spillover costs on financial markets, market participants can-
not protect themselves through contract or investment diversi-
fication.  In this situation, systemic risk manifests.44  One of 
these alternative forms may then become even more attractive 
as a means to mitigate this risk.  A partnership, mutual, or 
cooperative might reduce firm size or internalize spillover costs, 
in either case reducing the risk profile of the firm vis-à-vis 
financial markets.  In these scenarios, higher market con-
tracting costs might outweigh any costs associated with owner-
ship of these alternative organizational forms.  Note that while 
an alternative organizational form might address systemic risk, 
it can never do so to perfection.  Absent regulation or external 
constraints, no financial firm has incentive to completely inter-
nalize all the costs of its failure.  The analysis in this Article is 
instead comparative: what net social benefits or costs does an 
alternative organizational form for a financial company have 
relative to an investor-owned counterpart? 
Returning to many of these alternative organizational 
forms—the partnerships, mutuals, cooperatives, or clearing-
houses—would rethink and reverse the wave of demutualiza-
tion that swept through the financial services sector from the 
1970s to the early 2000s.  This wave resulted in financial ser-
vices firms converting to investor-owned corporations and con-
ducting initial public offerings (IPOs).45 Over this period, large 
43 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
44 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 371–74. 
45 In addition to investment banks and mutual insurance companies, other 
types of financial intermediaries with similar organizational structures also chose 
to transform into publicly traded corporations.  For some of the literature on the 
demutualization of stock exchanges, see Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and 
Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 107–10 
(2002); Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as 
Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 657, 667–73 (2001); Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock 
Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2575–85 (2006); Karmel, 
supra note 5 at 409–13. 
In the 2000s, the Mastercard and Visa payment card networks transformed 
from entities owned by card-issuing banks into corporations and conducted initial 
public offerings.  Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless 
Brand, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 144–45 (2007); Eric Dash, Big Payday for 
Wall St. in Visa’s Public Offering, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2008), https://www.ny 
times.com/2008/03/19/business/19visa.html [https://perma.cc/2CBL-A64E] 
(describing largest IPO in U.S. history to that date).  Scholars have analyzed how 
incorporation and IPOs responded to antitrust litigation against the networks. 
See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Updating Our Understanding of the Role of Lawyers: 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-JUL-20 17:16
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investment banks abandoned the partnership form.46  The end 
of the twentieth century saw a wave of demutualization among 
large life insurance companies.47  Both types of firms, invest-
ment banks and insurance companies, became publicly traded 
corporations in an effort to raise capital, expand the scope of 
their operations into new financial markets, and compete glob-
ally.48  These different categories of financial institutions also 
sought to compete with one another across financial services 
sectors, when both regulators, and Congress lowered the 
Glass-Steagall-era legal walls separating the businesses of 
banking, securities, and insurance.49  Looking backwards, this 
wave of demutualization followed a much earlier transforma-
tion in the twentieth century in which mutually owned banks 
and savings and loan associations lost ground to their investor-
owned, corporate competitors.50  Note that the transforma-
tional shift toward investor-owned corporations continues into 
the current day albeit with a twist: prominent asset manage-
ment firms have previously conducted IPOs and only recently 
began converting from partnerships to corporations.51  At the 
Lessons from MasterCard, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 179–84 (2007) (noting 
that the IPO was a way for MasterCard to compete with Visa); Joshua D. Wright, 
MasterCard’s Single Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 225, 229 (2007) 
(suggesting that MasterCard’s single entity strategy could shield it from liability 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
The benefits and costs of demutualization and remutualization in the stock 
exchange and payment network contexts are worth exploring but are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
46 See infra section I.A. 
47 See infra section I.C. 
48 See infra sections I.A and I.C. 
49 For a history of the end of Glass-Steagall, see ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR., 
TAMING THE MEGABANKS—WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASS-STEAGALL ACT ch. 7–8 (forth-
coming 2020), and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act, 17 WAKE  FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 492–503 (2017) 
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Road to Repeal].  For a germinal analysis of how the demise 
of Glass-Steagall fostered the creation of financial conglomerates that spanned 
banking, securities, and insurance business lines, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of 
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 972–79 (2009) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transfor-
mation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolida-
tion, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219–20. 
50 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 254–58. 
51 Michael J. de la Merced, Blackstone Will Ditch Partnership Structure to 
Draw More Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/04/18/business/dealbook/blackstone-corporate-structure.html [https:// 
perma.cc/58DR-MMM9] (“The Blackstone Group said on Thursday that it 
planned to convert itself into a standard corporation, becoming the latest invest-
ment firm to abandon its partnership structure . . . .”); Heather Perlberg, Carlyle 
Plans to Announce Conversion to C-Corp With Earnings, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-09/carlyle-plans-to-an-
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same time, U.S. law firms and other legal service companies 
have recently again flirted with the idea of following several 
U.K. law firms and conducting an IPO.52  The changes that 
came when previous financial sector firms converted to the 
corporate form, including enhanced risk-taking and refocusing 
from the interests of clients and customers to those of share-
holders, may now reach new sectors of the financial services 
industry.  This makes revisiting the consequences of earlier 
demutualizations of financial institutions all the more 
pressing. 
Many factors explain demutualization and the rise of inves-
tor-owned financial firms at the expense of mutuals.  The in-
creasing effectiveness of financial regulation represents 
perhaps the most surprising factor.53  Professor Hansmann ar-
gues that the shift in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century away from mutual banks and toward investor-owned 
corporate banks stemmed from the fact that more effective 
bank regulation convinced depositors increasingly to deposit 
their savings with the corporate banks they previously dis-
trusted as too unstable.54  Similarly, effective state insurance 
regulation gave assurances to life insurance policy holders that 
they could trust corporate insurers and not just mutuals.55 
However, now, the global financial crisis has called into ques-
tion the continuing effectiveness of banking and other regula-
tions.  The failure of financial institution regulation calls for a 
reckoning of the costs of decades of demutualization.  This fail-
ure also creates an opening for reconsidering and reviving the 
use of partnerships, cooperatives, and mutually owned entities 
in financial services.56 
Prosecutors and agencies might require remutualization of 
a firm that has committed severe misconduct as an alternative 
to shuttering the firm or imposing fines.  Policymakers can pro-
nounce-conversion-to-c-corp-with-earnings [https://perma.cc/G2F4-HAB3] 
(“The Washington-based firm would be the last of the private-equity giants to 
switch from a partnership to a corporation . . . .”). 
52 Roy Strom, Why U.S. Legal Businesses Flirt with IPOs But Don’t Commit, 
BLOOMBERGLAW (Sept. 12, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ 
why-u-s-legal-businesses-flirt-with-ipos-but-dont-commit [https://perma.cc/ 
D8J4-2DEV]. 
53 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 255–56. 
54 See id. at 255. 
55 See id. (explaining how these regulations “gave depositors some assurance 
that investor-owned banks would not speculate excessively with the funds en-
trusted to them. This form of regulation was evidently sufficiently effective to 
deprive the mutual banks of their decisive competitive advantage over investor-
owned banks”). 
56 See infra Part IV. 
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mote remutualization by providing preferences in financial reg-
ulation. These preferences could lighten regulatory 
requirements in areas in which partnerships or the mutual 
form provide partial policy solutions.  For example, if invest-
ment bank partnerships or mutually owned banks have incen-
tives to make less risky investments and thus pose a lower risk 
of insolvency, then policymakers should require less regulatory 
capital or charge lower premia for deposit insurance.57  Histori-
cally, policymakers granted these sorts of regulatory prefer-
ences to some mutually owned entities.58  Legally, they may be 
required to do so under certain statutory regimes.59 Policymak-
ers could also foster remutualization by restoring and ex-
panding the tax preferences that were historically given to 
certain mutual firms.60 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I takes stock of the 
history of demutualization across different categories of finan-
cial institutions.  It sketches out the social cost of financial 
institutions abandoning the partnership or mutual form and 
reviews legal scholarship that proposes reversion to the earlier 
organizational forms.  Part II shifts from the organizational 
form of individual firms to examine proposals for mutualizing 
risk, particularly systemic risk, across the industry.  Part III 
discusses policy instruments that could promote remutualiza-
tion.  Part IV outlines the benefits and costs of using these 
policy instruments, including the costs of the alternative orga-
nizational forms compared to the investor-owned corporation. 
I 
DEMUTUALIZATION AND REMUTUALIZATION ACROSS 
FINANCIAL SECTORS 
The introduction to this Article sketched a broad phenome-
non of financial institutions “demutualizing,” with successive 
waves of demutualization gathering strength in the last four 
57 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 257 (“If the government had responded by 
charging lower premiums on deposit insurance to mutual banks than to investor-
owned banks, the mutual banks might still have been able to translate their 
advantages as fiduciaries into a competitive advantage vis-à-vis investor-owned 
banks.”). 
58 Id. at 257–58. 
59 For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991 required that a federal agency change to a “risk-based” assessment ap-
proach for charging premia for its deposit insurance. Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 
2236 (Dec. 19, 1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)). 
60 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 275–76 (describing tax incentives for life in-
surance mutuals). 
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decades.61  However, analyzing the reasons for, and social 
costs of, different financial institutions abandoning the part-
nership or mutual form requires close attention to institutional 
detail and to differences among types of institutions.  To begin 
with, the partnerships, mutually owned companies, and coop-
eratives bear strong resemblance to one another but are differ-
ent types of legal entities.  The entity forms differ in terms of the 
economic agents that (1) possess the residual claims on the 
firm’s cash flows; (2) exercise control; and (3) bear the firm’s 
liabilities.  The following chart highlights some of the key differ-
ences among the legal features of partnerships, the archetypal 
mutually owned financial institution, and the typical investor-
owned stock corporation. 
61 Aggarwal, supra note 45, at 105. 
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PARTNERSHIPS, MUTUALLY OWNED COMPANIES, AND INVESTOR-
OWNED CORPORATIONS COMPARED 
 Organizational Form 





Who is the Partners.62 Members of the Shareholders.64 
firm’s mutual (e.g., 
residual depositors for a
claimant? mutual bank; 
(equity policyholders for a
owner) mutual insurance 
63company). 
Who Partners (or Directors (members Directors have 
exercises subset of exercise little day-to-day 
effective partners, e.g., 66practical control). control;67 
control over management Shareholders elect 
the firm? 65committee). directors and have 
voting rights on 
certain matters.68 






of the firm? 
Each partner is















generally not liable 
for more than 
value of their
71stock). 
62 The status of partners as residual claimant of the partnership can be seen 
most clearly in the dissolution provisions of state partnership statutes. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. VI § 15-807(a) (2018) (codifying partners’ liabilities to one 
another in cases of dissolution, settlement, and contribution). 
63 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247 (mutual savings banks), 252 (mutual 
savings and loan associations), 269–70 (mutual insurance companies). 
64 See generally Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minor-
ity Shareholder Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual 
Claimants and Maximizing Long-term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discre-
tion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725 (discussing rights of shareholders as residual 
claimants). 
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VI §§ 15-401(f), 407 (2018). 
66 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247, 252, 269–70. 
67 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII § 141(a) (2018). 
68 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII § 141(d), (k) (2018). 
69 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VI § 15-306(a) (2018). 
70 See, e.g., James R.  Garven, An Exposition of the Implications of Limited 
Liability and Asymmetric Taxes for Property-Liability Insurance, 59 J. RISK & INSUR-
ANCE 34, 48–49 (1992) (examining effects of limited liability on mutual property 
insurers). 
For the classic empirical study of the principal exception to the limited 
liability enjoyed by shareholders of corporations, see Robert B. Thompson, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil; An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). 
71 
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In addition, different categories of financial institutions 
have different business models, perform different economic 
functions, are governed by different legal regimes, suffer differ-
ent kinds of market failures, and thus raise different policy 
concerns.  All of this, as explained below, translates into 
demutualization causing different but broadly similar policy 
consequences depending on the type of financial institution. 
On the other hand, remutualization and the use of organiza-
tional form—whether partnership, mutual, or  collective—as 
regulatory instrument will also yield different but broadly simi-
lar policy results for investment banks versus banks and other 
lenders versus insurance companies. 
It is therefore important to dive into the institutional and 
historical detail of investment bank partnerships, mutual 
banks, and mutual insurance companies; the dynamics that 
pushed firms in these three industries to demutualize or shift 
toward the investor-owned corporation; and the consequences 
of these shifts. 
A. Investment Banks 
1. The Demise of Investment Banks as Partnerships 
Before 1970, U.S. stock exchange rules prevented publicly 
held corporations from being exchange members.  Accordingly, 
investment banks, which held seats on the New York Stock 
Exchange or other exchanges and were registered with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as broker-dealers, 
were organized as partnerships.72  The partners of each of 
these investment banks thus had joint and several liability for 
the debts of the firm.  As Professors Hill and Painter have de-
scribed, this created a very financially conservative ethos at 
these securities firms.73  Partners developed internal govern-
ance mechanisms and cultures to police each other’s risk-tak-
ing and to vet individuals carefully before admitting them as 
partners of the firm.  Many investment bankers believed that 
the partnership form sent a signal of the firm’s prudence to 
their customers.74 
The world began to experience a seismic shift in 1970 when 
Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette challenged the stock ex-
change rules and embarked on a course to convert into a pub-
licly traded corporation.75  The SEC acquiesced.  Over the next 
72 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 78. 
73 Id. at 97. 
74 Id. at 95–107. 
75 Id. at 78–79. 




813 2020] REMUTUALIZATION 
three decades, other major investment banks abandoned the 
partnership form and became publicly traded corporations, as 
indicated by the following timeline of IPOs: 
1970: Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette 
1971: Merrill Lynch 
1984: Lehman Brothers (via acquisition by Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, which was publicly listed) 
1985: Bear Stearns 
1985: Morgan Stanley 
1999: Goldman Sachs76 
A number of factors drove investment banks to abandon 
the partnership form, become corporations, and pursue IPOs. 
The business of investment banking changed radically in the 
1970s and 1980s.  For one, a sharp rise in securities trading 
volume in the 1960s created the so-called “back-office crisis” of 
1967–1970, in which investment banks struggled with paper 
processing of trades.77  Investment banks needed capital for 
technology investments to process trades and keep up with 
competitors, such as Merrill Lynch, that had successfully com-
puterized back-office operations.78  Thus, as the 1960s and 
1970s progressed, institutional investors came to value per-
sonal relationships with, and personalized investment advice 
from, investment bankers less.79  They had in-house personnel 
who could conduct investment analysis and make investment 
decisions. 
Further, other regulatory changes eroded other centers of 
profit for investment banks.  In 1975, Congress mandated that 
the SEC change its rules to end fixed-brokerage commis-
sions.80  Afterwards, investment banks/brokers had to negoti-
ate rates with customers, which eroded a steady stream of 
profits.  At the same time, brokers required huge amounts of 
capital to make technology investments to service the needs of 
76 ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITU-
TIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 237 (2007) [hereinafter MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT 
BANKING]; Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., The Demise of the Invest-
ment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence, 63 J. FIN. 311, 327 (2008) 
[hereinafter MORRISON & WILHELM, The Demise of Investment Banking 
Partnerships]. 
77 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 88. 
78 MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 235–38, 278. 
79 Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Trust, Reputation and Law: The 
Evolution of Commitment in Investment Banking, 7 J. LEGAL. ANALYSIS 363, 394–97 
(2015) [hereinafter Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law]. 
80 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 80. 
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institutional investors.81  These investors had assumed a domi-
nant share of stock market investing and wanted speedy exe-
cution of trades, better execution, and lower commissions.82 
And in 1982, the SEC allowed large issuers to conduct “shelf 
registrations” of securities.83  Issuers could thus perform much 
of the legal and financial preparation for a securities issuance 
in-house.  When they wanted to make an issuance of securities 
(taking securities “off the shelf”), issuers could then ask a num-
ber of underwriters to make competitive bids.84  This lessened 
the dependence of issuers on longstanding relationships with a 
particular investment banking firm and placed downward pres-
sure on investment banking commissions.  Faced with declin-
ing margins in their traditional brokerage and underwriting 
businesses, many investment banks turned to new business 
lines, such as proprietary trading, which required more capital 
investments and involved much more risk.85 
The old partnership structures served to bind partners to 
the firm and to dampen partner risk-taking.86  In a world in 
which client relationships mattered less and new riskier lines 
of business were prized, these structures and strictures be-
came less important and a source of perceived competitive dis-
advantage.  A new national emphasis on meritocracy placed 
further stress on the clubby world of investment bank partner-
ships.87  The social connections of and among partners mat-
tered less.88  At the same time, investment banker norms about 
putting client and customer interests first also eroded as bank-
ers sought more profitable lines of business.89 
Investment banks faced new competition and new opportu-
nities for expansion as financial services became increasingly 
globalized.90  Moreover, the erosion of Glass-Steagall rules sep-
arating the commercial banking, investment banking/securi-
81 See id. at 73, 87–89. 
82 Id. at 73, 78–80. 
83 Id. at 81. 
84 Id. at 82. 
85 Id. at 73–74, 81–83; see Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, 
supra note 79, at 394–97; see also Alan D. Morrison et al., Investment-Banking 
Relationships: 1933–2007, at 35 (Saı̈d Business School Working Paper No. 2014-
1), https://web.northeastern.edu/kkrishnan/Wilhelm_paper.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XR7L-ZUXU] (documenting declining interest among securities issuers 
in long-term relationships with investment banks). 
86 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 96–97. 
87 Id. at 89; Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, 
at 397. 
88 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 72, 89–90. 
89 Id. at 100–05. 
90 Id. at 72. 
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ties, and insurance meant new competitors for investment 
banks.91  Depository banks and insurance companies entered 
lines of the securities business traditionally reserved for invest-
ment banks.92  The investment banking industry sued the reg-
ulators of commercial banks in unsuccessful attempts to block 
these new entrants into the securities business.93 
Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm describe the tipping 
point in an investment bank’s calculus of whether to switch 
from partnership to publicly traded corporation when new 
technologies generated sufficient economies of scale to the in-
vestment banking business that individual partners no longer 
had incentives to mentor junior colleagues.94  Economies of 
scale at some point dwarfed any reputational loss to a firm 
from declining mentorship and monitoring of junior employees. 
Meanwhile, the advent of personal computing together with the 
rise of financial engineering and quantitative approaches to 
investing meant that investment banks needed more capital for 
technology.95  At the same time, these dynamics also dimin-
ished the importance of tacit knowledge and relationships. 
Morrison and Wilhelm argue that the order in which invest-
ment banks went public illustrates these forces at work.  The 
first firms to abandon the partnership form and conduct IPOs 
were firms active in securities markets, while the last partner-
ship holdouts were firms like Goldman Sachs that relied on 
advisory businesses.96 
The Goldman IPO marked the end of a contentious fight 
among old and new guard partners at that firm about the firm’s 
culture, the reputational value for clients of Goldman being 
organized as a partnership, and the risk-taking and business 
model of the firm.  After the IPO, the investment bank moved 
toward businesses such as proprietary trading that were less 
client-centered compared to traditional business lines (such as 
securities underwriting) and involved a higher degree of risk to 
the firm and its customers.  The Goldman IPO also marked the 
91 Id. at 84–85. 
92 Id.; MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 281–84, 
296–300. 
93 See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990) (suing the Comptroller of the Currency); Sec. 
Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 
U.S. 1059 (1988) (suing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
94 MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 276–77. 
95 Id. at 279–80. 
96 Id. at 276–280; Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra 
note 79, at 392–94, Morrison & Wilhelm, The Demise of Investment Banking 
Partnerships, supra note 76, at 314–15. 
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end of the era of major U.S. investment banks being organized 
as private partnerships.97 
IPOs gave partners of investment banks enormous 
payouts.98  IPOs also gave investment banks new tools for com-
pensation.99  They could now pay traders and other employees 
with stock options and restricted stock.100  These forms of com-
pensation dramatically altered the incentives of employees to 
take risks.101  This change in investment banker pay mirrored 
a large movement among American corporations to use com-
pensation to make management more responsive to sharehold-
ers and to promote shareholder value as an overarching 
goal.102  Investment bank employees received a hidden boost to 
compensation compared to the old partnerships because per-
sonal liability was jettisoned.103  A lack of joint and several 
liability also meant bankers needed to take less care in vetting 
new colleagues.104 
IPOs also left investment banking firms flush with cash, 
which they used for acquisition sprees.105  The investment 
banking and brokerage industry underwent rapid and massive 
consolidation.  Capital also allowed investment banks to 
purchase other kinds of financial firms and enter other busi-
nesses as regulators lowered the Glass-Steagall-era walls sepa-
rating the securities business from that of banking and 
insurance.106 
2. Consequences 
Professors Hill and Painter explain how this shift away 
from partnerships transformed Wall Street firms and the entire 
97 See STEVEN G. MANDIS, WHAT  HAPPENED TO  GOLDMAN  SACHS: AN  INSIDER’S 
STORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DRIFT AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 95 (2013). 
98 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 112. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 105–07. 
101 Id. at 119. 
102 Id. at 105–06. 
103 Hill and Painter illustrate the effects on limited liability on compensation 
with an anecdote from an old investment banking partnership.  They discuss the 
time when an individual was named partner at the old Salomon Brothers firm, a 
senior partner cautioned him to tell his spouse “that once you sign the partner-
ship papers next week you will be personally liable for $2 billion.” HILL & PAINTER, 
supra note 3, at 97 (citing Henry Kaufman, Henry Kaufman on Civility in the 
Financial Sector, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (June 20, 2011), https://www.carnegiecoun-
cil.org/studio/multimedia/20110620-henry-kaufman-on-civility-in-the-finan-
cial-sector [https://perma.cc/DWN6-ZDAY]. 
104 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 95. 
105 Id. at 73–74, 78–79. 
106 Id. at 84–85. 
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industry.107  They link the loss of joint and several liability at 
investment banks to a greater appetite for risk-taking and 
transactions that compromised client interests and bent finan-
cial laws and regulation.108  Removing personal liability trig-
gered or reinforced shifts in the culture of investment banks 
that prioritized profit and risk.109  Professors Hill and Painter 
trace how lower individual liability and organizational dynam-
ics led to a series of calamitous investment bank actions in the 
years preceding, during, and after the global financial crisis. 
These actions include the following: 
• Creating extremely risky asset-backed securities and 
other financial instruments, selling them to customers, 
and hiding the risks;110 
• Concealing investment banks’ own risks from their credi-
tors and investors and from regulators;111 
• Helping clients conceal leverage and risk from 
governments;112 
• Manipulating financial markets and indices such as 
LIBOR;113 and 
• Evading laws and regulations, including doing business 
with sanctioned countries and assisting clients in evading 
taxes.114 
The demise of the investment bank partnership increased 
individual banker mobility, weakening loyalty to individual 
firms.115  At the same time that investment banks became part-
nerships, scholars argue, investment bankers became less 
concerned with firm reputation.116  Meanwhile, individual rep-
utations assumed a greater importance as a “star culture” took 
hold at many investment bank firms.117  The increasing com-
107 Id. at 79–80 (noting that removing personal liability incentivizes bankers to 
take big risks because it is the shareholders, not the bankers, who own the banks’ 
capital and therefore have to absorb any losses). 
108 Id. at 90. 
109 Id. at 72. 
110 Id. at 22–39. 
111 Id. at 39–49; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
112 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 54–57 (noting that Greece’s cross-
currency swap with Goldman Sachs—which relied on an invented exchange 
rate—helped disguise Greece’s true financial condition). 
113 Id. at 49–53.  For analysis of the manipulation of LIBOR and other financial 
benchmarks, see Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1929 (2017); Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215 
(2015). 
114 Id. at 62–65. 
115 MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 281–84. 
116 See Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at 
390. 
117 Id. at 367–68, 399. 
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plexity of investment bank business further undermined mu-
tual trust between banks and their clients.118  Some scholars 
maintain that declining concern with investment bank firm 
reputation contributed to the financial crisis.119 
3. Policy Solutions 
To remedy the incentives that skew in favor of excessive 
risk taking, abuse of client trust, manipulation, and law-break-
ing, Professors Hill and Painter propose reintroducing personal 
liability for senior investment banks.120  They formulate a “cov-
enant banking” regime in which an investment bank would 
voluntarily impose a set of contractual obligations on its highly 
compensated bankers.  This regime would subject bankers to 
liability for at least a portion of the firm’s debts upon insol-
vency, as well as for regulatory fines and civil judgments. 
B. Banks and Lenders 
Banking experienced a transformation similar to that of 
the investment banking industry, albeit one that occurred 
much earlier.  Mutual banks once enjoyed a dominant position 
in American banking, but lost ground to investor-owned banks 
for surprising reasons and with dramatic consequences.121 
The history of mutually owned banks and banking cooper-
atives begins with mutual savings banks, the first of which was 
founded in the United States in Massachusetts in 1816.122  By 
1849, the United States had eighty-seven mutual savings 
banks, primarily in the Northeastern and mid-Atlantic cities. 
Distributed earnings for those banks were shared among de-
positors.  However, depositors possessed no voting rights. 
Control was exercised by a “self-perpetuating” board of direc-
tors.  These mutual banks represented a valuable means for 
working class individuals to deposit savings in an era in which 
investor-owned banks, which raised funds primarily by issuing 
118 Zhaohui Chen et al., Investment Bank Governance and Client Relation-
ships 35–36 (Dec. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296347 [https://perma.cc/8KHE-68J9]). 
119 Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at 368 
(citing Steven Davidoff Solomon, As Wall St. Firms Grow, Their Reputations Are 
Dying, N.Y. TIMES  DEALBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/26/as-wall-st-firms-grow-their-reputations-are-dying [https:// 
perma.cc/A9PG-R82Y]). 
120 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 146. 
121 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247–51, 254–56; MORRISON & WILHELM, 
INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 121, 146–49, 155–62. 
122 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 246–48. 
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stock rather than taking deposits, catered to merchants and 
businesses. 
In the nineteenth century, mutual savings banks thrived 
and enjoyed a significant share of the market.123  According to 
Professor Hansmann, bank regulation played a surprising role 
in the ascendance of investor-owned banks taking the corpo-
rate form.124  Where deregulation ushered in the end of the 
investment bank partnership, regulation catalyzed the rise of 
corporate banks.  Over the nineteenth century, individuals de-
posited their savings with mutual savings banks and not inves-
tor-owned banks because they did not trust the latter.125 
Without effective bank regulation, managers of investor-owned 
banks had incentives to invest in risky, speculative invest-
ments because of the asymmetry between those parties who 
enjoyed a bank’s profits versus those parties who bore its risks. 
When risky investments paid out, bank shareholders would 
earn handsome profits while depositor returns would remain 
fixed.  By contrast, if investments failed, bankruptcy could 
wipe out not only shareholders but also depositors.  Managers 
of investor-owned banks had an incentive to maintain only 
minimal net assets at the bank.  This increased leverage mag-
nified potential returns, but left depositors dangerously ex-
posed to losses.  Depositors could not realistically contract with 
management to protect themselves.  The riskiness of investor-
owned banks in the nineteenth century is reflected in their high 
rates of failure.  For example, half of all investor-owned banks 
formed between 1810 and 1820 had failed by 1825, and half of 
all banks formed between 1830 and 1840 failed by 1845. 
Unwilling to trust investor-owned banks with their savings, 
depositors instead chose to deposit their savings with the mu-
tual savings banks.126  Having depositors and customers as the 
residual claimants on the firm’s profits rather than corporate 
shareholders lowered the incentives of managers to make risky 
loans or other investments.  Even if members could not exer-
cise significant control over management, the fact that mem-
bers and no one else held the residual claims lessened the 
pressure on managers to generate higher profits and thus to 
take on more risk.  This underscores a vital lesson for using the 
organizational form as a regulatory tool: the identity of the 
residual claimant affects the risk-taking of a financial institu-
123 Id. at 246–49. 
124 Id. at 255. 
125 Id. at 247–49. 
126 Id. at 249–50. 
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tion even when the mechanisms by which owners can effec-
tively control management are weak. 
Mutual banks represented just one organizational form 
that competed with the investor-owned corporation.  The land-
scape of American banking featured numerous other entities 
with different residual claimants or controlling parties.  Other 
types of mutual and cooperative banking institutions emerged 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and provided other 
options for individuals to deposit savings and even to borrow. 
These institutions included the following: 
Investor-owned trust companies developed in the nineteenth 
century.127  Their compensation system for managers dif-
fered from that of investor-owned banks.128  Trust managers 
were paid a percentage of total trust assets rather than prof-
its, reducing their incentive to make risky investments and 
increasing their incentive to attract long term deposits. 
Mutual savings and loan associations (first called “mutual 
building and loan associations”) in the United States arose in 
the 1830s.129  These true cooperatives made consumer loans 
at a time when investor-owned banks would not.  Mutual 
savings and loans could make these loans because their 
tight-knit membership allowed them to screen borrowers. 
These firms could thus solve two problems often associated 
with lending: adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse 
selection occurs if a lender cannot differentiate between loan 
applicants with low compared to high credit risk.130  As in a 
classic “lemons” market, high credit risk borrowers may price 
more credit-worthy borrowers out of the market as lenders 
cannot distinguish the two groups and raise interest rates. 
Moral hazard can arise when borrowers have incentive to use 
loans once credit has been extended for risky projects and to 
default should those projects fail.131 
Credit unions entered the American financial services stage in 
the early twentieth century.132  The chartering statutes for 
credit unions required that these depositor cooperatives 
maintain a “common bond,” such as employment at the same 
place of work.  Professor Hansmann argues that this com-
127 Id. at 248. 
128 Id. at 252. 
129 Id. at 252–53. 
130 See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2075, 2129–30 (2016). 
131 See Omarova, supra note 4, at 469 (citing HEIDI  MANDANIS  SCHOONER  & 
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION 60–66 (2010)). 
132 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 258–60. 
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mon bond works to mitigate opportunistic behavior by bor-
rowers in the same way that mutual ownership in savings 
and loans addresses adverse selection and moral hazard.  For 
example, credit unions organized around places of employ-
ment may have greater information on the creditworthiness 
of borrowers.  Credit unions may also have additional mecha-
nisms to secure repayment (via payroll deductions) and po-
lice borrower behavior (through social pressure of coworkers 
and employer sanctions). 
Mutual and cooperative banks not only make less risky 
investment decisions, but data indicates that they also offer 
more consumer-friendly terms to borrowers. For example, 
Ryan Bubb and Alex Kaufman compared contractual terms in 
loans offered by mutually owned lenders compared to those 
offered by investor-owned firms.133  They found that loans by 
mutually owned lenders imposed lower penalties on custom-
ers, such as lower penalty default interest rates.  Professors 
Bubb and Kaufman attribute this tendency to offer more con-
sumer-friendly terms to the difference in the identity of the 
residual claimant of mutually owned firms compared to inves-
tor-owned ones, as well as to the nonprofit status of these 
lenders.134 
These various kinds of mutual entities not only promoted 
public policy goals, they also were extremely successful busi-
nesses.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mu-
tual savings banks and mutual savings and loans enjoyed a 
significant market share of deposit-taking and bank lending in 
the United States.  In 1880, mutual savings banks held 87% of 
time deposits in the United States and mutual savings and loan 
associations held an additional 1% share.135  At that same 
point, investor-owned banks held only 12% of time deposits in 
the country.  The number of mutual and savings and loans 
continued to grow until the early twentieth century, peaking at 
12,600 firms in 1928.  By contrast, credit unions continued to 
grow throughout the twentieth century, with growth accelerat-
ing after the Second World War.136 
1. Demutualization 
The dominance of mutual savings banks and savings and 
loans eroded throughout the twentieth century.  In 1925, mu-
133 Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 11, at 39–40. 
134 Id. at 40–42. 
135 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 254. 
136 Id. at 259. 
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tual savings banks held 32% and mutual savings and loan 
institutions had 16% of U.S. deposits, while deposits in inves-
tor-owned banks climbed to 52%.137  Professor Hansmann 
cites several factors as contributing to this shift, including 
changes in the organizational structure of mutual banks and 
savings and loans.  For example, mutual savings and loans 
began to enjoy a larger and more fluid set of members.  This 
reduced the ability of members to control the institutions they 
owned.  Looser communal bonds among members diluted an 
important mechanism to counteract adverse selection and 
moral hazard among borrowers. 
However, regulation also played a role in the market shift 
toward investor-owned corporations.  This role can be seen first 
when regulation was absent, in the reasons for the original 
success of mutual banks.138  Professor Hansmann attributes 
the success of mutually owned and cooperative banks and 
lenders to a surprising dynamic.  Professor Hansmann argues 
that the introduction of successful bank prudential regulations 
in the nineteenth century assured depositors and, in turn, in-
vestors, of the safety and soundness of corporate banks.139  At 
that point, corporate banks then appeared to be a much safer 
place to deposit money than before.  This diminished the com-
parative advantage of banks organized as mutual or coopera-
tives.  In short, prudential statutes and regulations began to 
provide a substitute for the organizational form as a regulatory 
tool. 
As noted above, credit unions continued to thrive even as 
mutual savings banks and mutual savings and loan associa-
tions declined in importance.  However, the common bond re-
quirement at the core of credit union regulation has been 
incrementally relaxed.  Credit unions no longer need a tight 
common bond such as a common employer.140  Under 2018 
rule changes adopted by the National Credit Union Administra-
tion, credit unions are no longer restricted to membership 
under 2.5 million members; this has opened the door to “mega-
credit unions” whose membership and operation are national 
in scope.  Loosening the common bond not only allows for the 
creation of giant credit unions, it also weakens the mecha-
nisms described above for addressing opportunistic behavior 
137 Id. at 254–55. 
138 Id. at 247–51. 
139 Id. at 255. 
140 See Aaron D. Klein, Banklike Credit Unions Should Follow Bank Rules, AM. 
BANKER (June 25, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banklike-
credit-unions-should-follow-bank-rules [https://perma.cc/KP6U-BS5G]. 
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by borrowers.  This might, in turn, translate into less favorable 
interest rates and terms for all the borrowers of credit unions. 
2. Consequences of the Shift Away from Mutuals 
The shift away from mutually owned and cooperative 
banks toward investor-owned banks and savings and loans 
translated into a decrease in the social benefits that came with 
the mutual form, namely reduced firm risk-taking, more con-
sumer-friendly loan terms, and greater access to banking ser-
vices.141  The first consequence—greater risk-taking by 
investor owned firms—can be seen by comparing the rate of 
failures of mutually owned and cooperative banks and savings 
and loans versus their investor-owned counterparts.  Before 
and during major financial crises, investor-owned banks and 
savings and loans failed at significantly higher rates.  This pat-
tern held in the 1920s, during the Great Depression, and dur-
ing the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s.  Furthermore, the 
shift to investor-owned lender can have costs in terms of con-
sumer protection given the evidence that mutually owned and 
cooperative lenders, such as credit unions, tend to offer more 
consumer-friendly terms in loans and other financial products. 
C. Insurance Companies 
The mutual form has long enjoyed a significant share of 
insurance markets, particularly in life insurance.142  Section 
I.C.2 explains the structural advantages that mutuals enjoyed, 
particularly those resulting from having policyholders and not 
profit-oriented investors as the residual claimants of the firm. 
Mutual insurance firms have persisted despite theories 
from scholars that they would be plagued by agency costs.143 
Scholars posited a “managerial discretion hypothesis” that 
managers of a mutual insurer could behave opportunistically 
vis-à-vis policyholders in risk selection and pricing of poli-
141 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 246, 256–57. 
142 Infra section I.C.1. 
143 For an overview of these theories and a survey of research into mutual 
insurance companies, see Antti Talonen, Systematic Literatures Review of Re-
search on Mutual Insurance Companies, 4 J. CO-OPERATIVE  ORG. & MGMT. 53 
(2016); see also CNTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN ACCOUNTING AND SECURITY ANALYSIS, COLUM-
BIA  BUSINESS  SCHOOL, ANALYSIS AND  VALUATION OF  INSURANCE  COMPANIES, 7 (Nov. 
2010), http://www.columbia.edu/~dn75/Analysis%20and%20Valuation 
%20of%20Insurance%20Companies%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G398-
JTC3] (explaining hypothesis that “mutuals should be less efficient than stocks 
due to higher agency costs”). 
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cies.144  However, there is little empirical support for opportu-
nistic behavior by managers of mutual insurers.145  In fact, 
studies indicate that stock insurers take on greater risk and 
enter riskier business lines compared to mutual counter-
parts.146  This can result in mutuals having relatively lower 
insolvency rates.147  Stock insurers do have higher executive 
compensation148 and experience higher management turnover 
in response to firm performance.149  Some academics believe 
that the reduced risk of a corporate takeover allows mutuals to 
maintain higher surpluses and thus to offer better insurance 
against catastrophic risks.150  Other scholars have found that 
mutual insurers maintain high surpluses151 and high degrees 
of liquid assets.152 
Scholars have also posited an “expense preference” hy-
pothesis, which holds that weaker control mechanisms in mu-
tual companies allow management to increase salaries and 
144 See generally J. David Cummins, Mary A. Weiss & Hongmin Zi, Organiza-
tional Form and Efficiency: The Coexistence of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability 
Insurers, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1254 (1999) [hereinafter Cummins et al., Organizational 
Form and Efficiency] (articulating and testing different theories explaining the 
organization form that insurance companies take); David Mayers & Clifford W. 
Smith, Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in 
Insurance Markets, 54 J. BUS. 407 (1981) (testing incentive problems when man-
agers of insurance companies can exercise discretion). 
145 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–72, 279, 285–86. 
146 Joan Lamm-Tennant & Laura Starks, Stock Versus Mutual Ownership 
Structures: The Risk Implications, 66 J. BUS. 29, 37–44 (1993) (finding stock insur-
ers have significantly higher risk profiles compared to mutuals in property liability 
insurance and underwrite more policies in riskier lines and markets); Christian 
Laux & Alexander Muermann, Financing Risk Transfer Under Governance 
Problems: Mutual Versus Stock Insurers, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 333, 348 (2010). 
147 See also J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington & Robert Klein, Insolvency 
Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability 
Insurance, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 516, 522 (1995) (finding support for previous 
studies showing mutual in property-liability insurance have lower insolvency 
rates; mutual status improves accuracy of risk-based capital regulatory 
formulae). 
148 David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Executive Compensation in the Life 
Insurance Industry, 65 J. BUS. 51, 68–73 (1992) [hereinafter Mayers & Smith, 
Executive Compensation]. 
149 Enya He & David W. Sommer, CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: 
Evidence from the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry, 78 J. RISK & INS. 673, 
689–98 (2011). 
150 Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Mar-
kets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 214 (1997). 
151 Howard E. Winklevoss & Robert A. Zelten, An Empirical Analysis of Mutual 
Life Insurance Company Surplus, 40 J. RISK & INS. 403, 421–25 (1973). 
152 See generally Yung-Ming Shiu, Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from the 
United Kingdom Life Insurance Industry, 13 APPLIED  ECON. LETTERS 111 (2006) 
(testing when and which types of insurance companies hold more liquid assets). 
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other costs.153  Although one cross-country comparative study 
supports this hypothesis,154  multiple other studies failed to do 
so.155  One study showed mutual insurance companies are not 
less cost-efficient than their investor-owned stock counter-
parts.156  Again, mutuals have lower levels of executive com-
pensation.157  Other studies show that an insurance 
company’s expense levels do not fall after demutualization,158 
and that expense levels do not appear to explain the decision to 
demutualize.159  Historical studies of British insurers show 
lower cost levels for mutual companies.160 
Scholars note that mutuals use several strategies or have 
certain features to address agency costs.  For example, several 
studies note that mutual boards have more outside directors 
than their stock counterparts.161  As noted below, Professor 
Hansmann argues that having policyholders as an insurer’s 
residual claimant dampens agency costs as management has 
no other constituency, such as investors, to whom it must 
respond.162  Evidence shows mutuals offer lower priced policies 
153 Cummins et al., Organizational Form and Efficiency, supra note 144, at 
1255, 1268–69. 
154 Id. 
155 E.g., J. David Cummins, Maria Rubio-Misas & Hongmin Zi, The Effect of 
Organizational Structure on Efficiency: Evidence from the Spanish Insurance Indus-
try, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3113, 3136–39, 3143–49 (2004) (finding evidence for 
hypothesis only with respect to largest Spanish mutual). 
156 Christian Biener & Martin Eling, Organization and Efficiency in the Interna-
tional Insurance Industry: A Cross-Frontier Analysis, 221 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 
454, 460, 467 (2012). 
157 Mayers & Smith, Executive Compensation, supra note 148. 
158 Michael J. McNamara & S. Ghon Rhee, Ownership Structure and Perform-
ance: The Demutualization of Life Insurers, 59 J. RISK & INS. 221, 229, 236 (1992). 
159 James M. Carson, Mark D. Forster & Michael J. McNamara, Changes in 
Ownership Structure: Theory and Evidence from Life Insurer Demutualizations, 21 
J. INS. ISSUES 1, 12–14 (1998). 
160 See generally Christopher O’Brien & Paul Fenn, Mutual Life Insurers: Ori-
gins and Performance in Pre-1900 Britain, 54 BUS. HIST. 325 (2012) (explaining 
evolution of mutual life insurance companies in Britain including their lower 
costs compared to proprietary firms); Robin Pearson, Mutuality Tested: The Rise 
and Fall of Mutual Fire Insurance Offices in Eighteenth-Century London, 44 BUS. 
HIST. 1 (2002) (examining factors leading to rise of fire insurance companies 
taking the mutual form). 
161 David Mayers, Anil Shivdasani & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Board Composition 
and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 70 J. BUS. 33, 
34–35, 43–44, 56–57 (1997). 
162 Infra section I.C.2. Hansmann’s arguments build off work by other schol-
ars working in the theory of the firm literature.  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. 
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eu-
gene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Form and Investment Deci-
sions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985). 
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compared to stock companies.163  This meshes with another 
scholarly finding: a study shows U.K. mutual life insurers offer 
higher payouts for policy holders, lower cost ratios, and higher 
growth rates than stock counterparts.164 
1. The Emergence and Dominance of Mutuals in Life 
Insurance 
In the mid-1990s, mutual insurance companies enjoyed a 
share of approximately 50% of the life insurance market and 
25% of the property and liability insurance market.165  At that 
time, one life insurance mutual, Prudential, had assets exceed-
ing those of any U.S. industrial corporation.  Mutual life insur-
ance companies first appeared in the United States in the 
1840s.  The first seven mutual companies formed in that dec-
ade remained in existence until the end of the twentieth cen-
tury and were then counted among the largest mutuals.  In 
their first decades in existence, mutual life insurance compa-
nies largely drove investor-owned corporate life insurers out of 
the market by writing the first long-term life insurance policies. 
2. Life-Insurance Policyholder Protection: The Importance 
of the Residual Claimant 
Professor Hansmann attributes the business success of 
mutual life insurance companies and their ability to offer these 
longer term contracts to the mutual form itself.166  He explains 
that long term life insurance policies create a large degree of 
uncertainty for consumers who worry that insurance compa-
nies may not survive long enough to pay their future claims. 
Policyholders may die sooner than expected, the actuarial fore-
casts on which insurers depend may miscalculate life expec-
tancy, and an insurance company’s investments may not earn 
sufficient returns to pay claims.  As a result, the policyholder 
may worry that the insurer may not retain adequate reserves to 
cover its expected policy payouts.  If shareholders are the 
residual claimant of the insurance company, they may push 
163 Alexander Braun, Hato Schmeiser & Przemyslaw Rymaszewski, Stock vs. 
Mutual Insurers: Who Should and Who Does Charge More?, 242 EUR. J. OPERA-
TIONAL RES. 875, 888 (2015). 
164 See generally Seth Armitage & Peter Kirk, The Performance of Proprietary 
Compared with Mutual Life Offices, 14 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 238 (1994) (compar-
ing proprietary mutual life insurance companies and finding mutuals perform 
better in average payouts on endowment policies, average cost ratios, and average 
growth rates). 
165 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 265–66. 
166 See id. at 266–68. 
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management to make riskier investments to earn greater re-
turns.  This runs contrary to the interest of policyholders for 
conservative reserves.167 
This under-reserving problem is addressed in the mutual 
form because policyholders are the residual claimant.  Even if 
policyholders cannot realistically exercise control over manage-
ment of the company, the fact that no other patron of the firm 
is the residual claimant reduces incentives of management to 
make risky investments and to under-reserve.168  Other re-
searchers have found that mutuals enjoy a competitive advan-
tage in life insurance and other insurance lines with long 
horizon policies; longer time periods increase the risk of ex-
ploitation of policyholders by insurers.169  The mutual form 
reduces the incentive to exploit policyholders who are also the 
residual claimants.  Many mutual insurance companies adver-
tise their mutual status and lack of shareholders as making 
them behave more in the interest of policyholders.170 This logic 
emphasizing the importance of the residual claimant meshes 
with the explanation of why mutual banks and credit unions 
offer more consumer friendly terms to their customers.171 
When customers are the residual claimant, the firm’s incen-
tives to behave opportunistically are greatly reduced. 
The status of policyholders as residual claimants explains 
other ways in which mutual life insurers offer policy-holders 
more consumer-friendly contracts.  Professor Hansmann ex-
plains that life insurers face a particular adverse selection 
problem with writing long term policies.172  A policyholder may 
stop making payments later in the term of the policy when her 
or his expected benefits under the policy no longer clearly ex-
ceed the premiums she or he must pay.173  Healthy policyhold-
ers are more likely to stop paying premia and drop their 
policies, but less healthy customers who are more likely to 
trigger policy payouts will remain in the insurance company’s 
risk pool.  Corporate life insurers often respond to this risk by 
front-loading the premia that policyholders must pay.  But 
167 See id.; Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mu-
tual Versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 129–34 (1985) [hereinafter 
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies]. 
168 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–70; Hansmann, The Organization of In-
surance Companies, supra note 167, at 129–31. 
169 HANSMANN, supra note 12; Cummins et al., Organizational Form and Effi-
ciency, supra note 144, at 1255. 
170 E.g., Landes, supra note 16. 
171 Supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
172 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 266–69. 
173 Id. at 269. 
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locking policyholders into longer term contracts has a perverse 
consequence: policyholders are less likely to exit even when the 
insurer is behaving opportunistically toward them.  Front-load-
ing premia addresses the adverse selection problem at the cost 
of dulling a mechanism to discipline insurers.  Mutuals, by 
contrast, can mitigate the adverse selection problem in an alto-
gether different way, namely by making the policyholder the 
residual claimant and thus changing her or his incentives.174 
Other theoretical and empirical research attributes the success 
of mutual insurers to addressing adverse selection problems 
among policyholders.175 
The mutual form also helped life insurers manage an addi-
tional risk—inflation risk—with long term contracts and avoid 
passing on this risk to policyholders in the form of higher 
premia.  Long term insurance contracts place tremendous 
pressure on the business model of life insurers.176  If the aver-
age mortality rate, the real rate of return on investments, or the 
rate of inflation differ from forecasts, the insurer can suffer 
significant losses.  The inflation rate poses particular problems. 
If inflation rises over the term of the policy, the insurer wins 
but the policyholder loses as higher price levels in the economy 
reduce the real value of the payout.  If inflation rises at a lower 
than expected rate, the results reverse: the policyholder re-
ceives, and the insurer makes, a higher real payout.  By placing 
the policyholder on both sides of the transaction, a mutual 
insurance company obviates the need for inflation risk to be 
priced into the contract. 
This same logic explains how mutual life insurance compa-
nies could deal with other zero-sum risks from long term con-
tracts.  Mutual life insurance companies do not need to price 
these risks into the contract or include hard-to-understand 
contractual provisions to account for these risks.  Any loss to 
the customer as residual claimant of the firm is offset by her or 
174 See id. at 268–70. 
175 Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, Adverse Selection, Aggregate Uncer-
tainty, and the Role for Mutual Insurance Contracts, 63 J. BUS. 493, 504, 507–09 
(1990); James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, The Formation of Mutual Insurers in 
Markets with Adverse Selection, 78 J. BUS. 529, 552–53 (2005).  Historical studies 
of insurance markets in other countries also attribute the emergence and early 
market share enjoyed by mutual insurers to the advantages of their organiza-
tional form in addressing adverse selection problems and unpredictability of aver-
age losses among insured parties.  Mike Adams et al., Mutuality as a Control for 
Information Asymmetry: A Historical Analysis of the Claims Experience of Mutual 
and Stock Fire Insurance Companies in Sweden, 1889 to 1939, 53 BUS. HIST. 1074, 
1075–77 (2011): Pearson, supra note 160;. 
176 See id. at 270–71. 
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his benefit as policyholder.177  The mutual form also addresses 
the severe asymmetries of information suffered by consumers 
in the insurance context.178 
3. Regulation as a Substitute for the Mutual Form 
Just as banking regulation gave assurances to depositors 
that banks organized as stock corporations were stable enough 
to be entrusted with deposits, so too did the introduction of 
state insurance regimes give greater assurance to policyholders 
that investor-owned insurance companies would not under-
reserve or behave opportunistically.179  This reduced some of 
the comparative advantage that the mutual form enjoyed in life 
insurance.  Professor Hansmann traces the introduction of 
state insurance statutes in the 1850s and 1860s to the decline 
in the ratio of mutual life insurers to their corporate 
counterparts. 
4. Why the Mutual Form Works in Life Insurance: Costs 
to the Mutual Form 
Professor Hansmann attributes the success of the mutual 
form in life insurance to several additional factors. First, life 
insurers historically required relatively little startup capital.180 
However, the mutual form limited the ability of these firms to 
raise additional capital beyond attracting new policyholders or 
retaining earnings.  As described below, the search for addi-
tional capital drove a wave of life insurers to demutualize at the 
turn of the twenty-first century.181 
Second, the mutual form in life insurance benefitted from 
the fact that policyholders were buying relatively homogenous 
products.  This meant the interests of the firm’s residual claim-
ants were largely aligned.182  Although the mutual form im-
poses high potential agency costs—a large number of dispersed 
owners may be unable to effectively organize to discipline man-
agement—empirical evidence does not show a difference in av-
erage costs between stock and mutual life insurers. This may 
be due to the fact that shareholders of life insurance corpora-
tions also face agency costs.  However, more importantly, 
changing the residual claimant to policyholders also ensures 
177 See id. 
178 Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at 
132. 
179 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 271–72. 
180 See id. at 273. 
181 Infra section I.C.5. 
182 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273. 
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that management is not responsive to the demands of any 
other claimant.  Management thus has less incentive to behave 
opportunistically vis-à-vis policyholders. 
The benefits of the policyholder as residual claimant, how-
ever, diminish if the insurer seeks to offer multiple products, 
particularly products outside life insurance.183  Less homoge-
nous products would translate into potential greater conflicts 
among the interests of policyholders.  The desire to offer multi-
ple products may provide a supplementary theoretical explana-
tion for the wave of demutualization of life insurers explained 
below. 
5. Demutualization Wave Among Life Insurers at the 
Turn of the Twenty-First Century 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the life insurance 
industry experienced a wave of demutualization, with some of 
the largest insurers choosing to become corporations and con-
duct IPOs.  These companies included the following:184 
Insurance Company Year of Demutualization 
John Hancock 1999 
Manufacturers 1999 




Scholars attribute this wave to a number of factors, includ-
ing the following: 
(1) a decline in consumer interest in life insurance products 
compared to growing insurance company revenue from 
wealth management and annuity products; 
(2) the ending of Glass-Steagall’s prohibitions against insur-
ance, banking, and securities businesses within the same 
conglomerate; 
(3) changes in the Internal Revenue Code that ended tax 
advantages for mutual insurance companies; and 
(4) the prospect of foreign insurance companies entering the 
U.S. market.185 
183 Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at 
135. 
184 Lal C. Chugh & Joseph W. Meador, Demutualization in the Life Insurance 
Industry: A Study of Effectiveness, 27 REV. BUS. 10, 16 (2006). 
185 Id. at 10. 
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Studies have shown that access to capital is the primary 
reason for insurance company demutualization.186  This does 
not mean that mutuals do not have any advantages with re-
spect to capital raising; in fact, they may have additional op-
portunities to raise capital during financial crises by raising 
premia from policyholders.187  Other scholars found that a mix 
of motivations—operational efficiency, access to capital and tax 
advantages—drove demutualizations generally.188 One study, 
however, found no efficiency gains for insurers that 
demutualized.189 
6. Size and Systemic Risk Concerns 
In addition to losing the consumer/policyholder protection 
benefits of the mutual form outlined above, this demutualiza-
tion wave created significant systemic risk concerns.  Demutu-
alization allowed large insurance conglomerates to grow in 
sheer size, connectedness to other financial institutions, and 
importance to broader financial markets.  It also may have 
made them more fragile and susceptible to volatility in capital 
markets, including via losses on the asset side of their balance 
sheets and dependence on short term financing on the liability 
side.190 
Demutualization allowed life insurance companies to grow 
their size and the scope of their operations.191  Several ex-
panded heavily into capital markets activities, including the 
following: 
• derivatives transactions; 
• lending via repurchase agreements (repos); 
• financing themselves through asset-backed securitization 
vehicles; and 
186 Krupa S. Viswanathan & J. David Cummins, Ownership Structure Changes 
in the Insurance Industry: An Analysis of Demutualization, 70 J. RISK & INS. 401, 
412–16 (2003); Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & Richard D. Phillips, Form Over Mat-
ter: Differences in the Incentives to Convert Using Full Versus Partial Demutualiza-
tion in the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, 79 J. RISK & INS. 305, 307, 330–31 (2012). 
187 Laux & Muermann, supra note 146. 
188 Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of the Mutual 
Organizational Form: An Investigation of the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, 42 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1011 (2010). 
189 Vivian Jeng, Gene C. Lai & Michael J. McNamara, Efficiency and Demutual-
ization: Evidence From the U.S. Life Insurance Industry in the 1980s and 1990s, 74 
J. RISK & INS. 683, 704–09 (2007). 
190 For an analysis of the systemic risk posed by insurance companies, see 
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014). 
191 Id. at 12 (citing McNamara & Rhee, supra note 158, at 221–31). 
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• engaging in securities lending.192 
One can see examples of the growth of these activities by com-
paring the annual reports of the Prudential and MetLife five 
years after their IPOs with the registration statements for their 
IPOs.  The annual reports five years later include more exten-
sive disclosure on capital market activities, including products 
offered to customers, investments in capital markets, and new 
sources of financing for the company.193 
Prudential194 and MetLife195 were two of the four nonbank 
companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) designated as “Systemically Important Financial Insti-
tutions” pursuant to its authority under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.196  The FSOC cited the capital markets activities of these 
insurance companies in its determinations that these firms 
192 E.g., FIN. STABILITY  OVERSIGHT  COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE  FINANCIAL  STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT  COUNCIL’S  FINAL  DETERMINATION  REGARDING  PRUDENTIAL  FINANCIAL, INC., 
(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Docu-
ments/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLT2-PH65] 
[hereinafter FSOC PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION] (detailing risk from Prudential’s deriv-
atives, repo, and securities lending businesses among others); FIN. STABILITY OVER-
SIGHT  COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE  FINANCIAL  STABILITY  OVERSIGHT  COUNCIL’S  FINAL 
DETERMINATION  REGARDING  METLIFE, INC. (Dec. 18, 2014), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public 
%20Basis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6USN-K6LE] [hereinafter FSOC METLIFE DESIG-
NATION] (detailing risks of MetLife’s sponsoring and obtaining financing via securi-
tization vehicles and securities lending). 
193 Compare MetLife, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 5, 2004), https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099219/000095012304002912/0000 
950123-04-002912-index.htm [https://perma.cc/TDA7-S7S3] (detailing Met-
Life’s 2003 financial performance, note especially the high capital markets activ-
ity), with  MetLife, Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 23, 1999), https:/ 
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099219/0000950123-99-010491-in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/JG7K-3TYC] (detailing MetLife’s pre-IPO financial 
situation and business model); compare Prudential Financial, Inc. Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1137774/000119312506041378/0001193125-06-041378-index.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/F52E-572Z] (detailing Prudential’s 2005 financial performance, note 
especially high capital markets activity), with Prudential Financial, Inc. Registra-
tion Statement  (Form S-1) (Apr. 9,  2001), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1137774/000095013001500607/0000950130-01-500607-index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UUB2-YJRG] (detailing Prudential’s pre-IPO financial situa-
tion and business model). 
194 FSOC Prudential Designation, supra note 192. 
195 FSOC MetLife Designation, supra note 192. 
196 Another of the companies designated by FSOC, American International 
Group (AIG), was an insurance conglomerate organized as a corporation. FIN. 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S 
FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (July 8, 2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Ba-
sis%20of%20Final%20Determination%20Regarding%20American%20Interna-
tional%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/59W7-J4MT].  AIG was never 
organized as a mutual.  For the origins of the American International Group, see 
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merited systemic designation and regulation by the Federal 
Reserve.197  Although MetLife successfully challenged its desig-
nation in federal court198 and the FSOC later chose to rescind 
the designations of all other companies,199 some scholars have 
criticized the reasoning behind these court and agency deci-
sions against designation and argue that large insurance con-
glomerates continue to pose systemic risk concerns.200 
7. Mutuals in Property and Liability Insurance 
One additional example from the insurance context points 
to the circumstances in which the mutual form may prove suc-
cessful in financial services.  Professor Hansmann details how 
the mutual form historically enjoyed success in property and 
liability insurance.201  Even though some of the comparative 
advantages enjoyed by mutual compared to investor-owned 
firms in these business lines have dissipated, his analysis 
reveals some critical components for the market success of the 
mutual form.  Mutuals enjoyed an advantage in providing 
property and liability insurance to businesses in a time in 
which insurance companies could not easily distinguish be-
tween the risks posed by potential policyholders.  At the histor-
ical height of the mutual form in these business lines, actuarial 
RON SHELP & AL EHRBAR, FALLEN GIANT: THE AMAZING STORY OF HANK GREENBERG AND 
THE HISTORY OF AIG 35–39 (2nd ed. 2009). 
197 FSOC Prudential Designation, supra note 192, at 2. 
198 MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 
230–36 (D.D.C. 2016). 
199 E.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS 
FOR THE FINANCIAL  STABILITY  OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S  RESCISSION OF ITS  DETERMINATION 
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.  (Oct. 16, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/ 
system/files/261/Prudential-Financial-Inc-Rescission.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
J4N4-Q8SC] (justifying the decision to de-designate Prudential because the com-
pany now has a sustainable business model, capital strength, and a comprehen-
sive risk management system); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, LIST OF 
DESIGNATIONS, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/ 
default.aspx#nonbank [https://perma.cc/BGU4-35ZZ] (listing links to FSOC de-
cisions to designate and rescind designations of major financial companies). 
200 See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of 
Prudential Financial, 71 STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 171, 171–72 (2018), (criticizing 
de-designation of Prudential); see also Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & 
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to 
Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1458–65 (2019) (arguing that the 
district court opinion in the MetLife case, the FSOC de-designation decisions, and 
proposed FSOC changes to designation process all impose impossible standards 
on designation); Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-
Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1851–60 (2017) (dis-
cussing effects of Dodd-Frank’s FSOC designation provisions on deterring large 
nonbanks from engaging in activities that could pose systemic risks). 
201 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 276–77. 
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data were not available or reliable.202  The mutual form worked 
because policyholders possessed greater information about 
their own risks; they could solve the problem of asymmetric 
information by screening each other for risk.  This success de-
pended on policyholders being relatively homogenous in terms 
of the risks for which they were being insured.  Similar risks 
meant that the residual claimants to the firm had similar inter-
ests.  Homogenous policyholders who co-existed in tightly knit 
communities could also address the risk of moral hazard.203 
Mutuals in property and liability insurance were particu-
larly attractive when policyholders could not purchase insur-
ance in competitive markets.204  Rather than pay less than 
competitive rates, businesses would band together to form a 
mutual.  This points to an insight applicable to mutuals in 
financial services more generally: customers facing impaired 
competition provides an impetus for mutual formation.205 
D. Common Threads Among Industries 
1. Reasons for Demutualization; Industry Dynamics 
Despite differences in their organizational forms, business 
models, and historical evolutions, common threads tie together 
the demutualization of investment banks, banks, savings and 
loan associations, and insurance companies.  When firms 
abandoned the partnership or mutual form and conducted an 
IPO, the existing owners often reaped significant payouts.206 
The new investor-owned firms could deploy capital to expand 
operations and acquire other companies.207  The acquiring 
firms could use their own stock as consideration for these 
transactions.208  Merger and acquisitions activity, in turn, 
202 Id. at 277–80. 
203 Other researchers have found advantages in the mutual form in terms of 
mitigating moral hazard among policyholders.  Lena Nekby, Pure Versus Mutual 
Health Insurance: Evidence from Swedish Historical Data, 71 J. RISK & INS. 115 
(2004); Bruce D. Smith & Michael Stutzer, A Theory of Mutual Formation and 
Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry, 8 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 545 (1995). 
204 Id. at 278–79. 
205 Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at 
149. 
206 Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 15. 
207 See Karl T. Muth & Andrew Leventhal, Mutuals: An Area of Legal Climate 
Change, 9 WM. & MARY  BUS. L. REV. 597, 607–10, 612 (2018) (discussing the 
benefits of mutualization and why a company chooses to mutualize). 
208 Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder 
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and 
Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 
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spurred industry consolidation and the growth of 
megafirms.209 
The erosion of Glass-Steagall-era legal separations among 
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies in the 1980s 
and 1990s meant that these different firms could increasingly 
compete with one another or join together under the umbrella 
of a financial conglomerate.210  Indeed, the prospects of compe-
tition across the financial sector and industry consolidation 
drove financial firms to seek to raise massive amounts of capi-
tal.211  Demutualization, industry consolidation, the disinte-
gration of Glass-Steagall, and competition that crossed 
financial sectors mutually reinforced one another in powerful 
feedback loops.  At the same time, enhanced global competition 
and the prospect of entering foreign markets contributed to a 
need for even more capital and additional waves of demutual-
ization.212  By the turn of the twenty-first century, demutual-
ization and these related dynamics transformed the U.S. 
financial services sector.  It was now dominated by large inter-
nationally active financial conglomerates that offered a full 
range of financial services, ranging from depository banking to 
traditional investment banking services (underwriting and 
mergers and acquisitions advice) to investment funds to insur-
ance to derivatives to trading and beyond.213 
2. Compensation and Incentives; Shareholders as 
Residual Claimants 
Against this backdrop, demutualized corporate financial 
institutions could also compensate employees with stock op-
tions and restricted stock.214  This benefitted employees who 
enjoyed liquid assets that could appreciate dramatically in 
value.  This dynamic could also spark compensation races 
among firms.  It also radically altered the incentive structure of 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725, 762 (describing triangular mergers, which often involve 
using company stock as consideration). 
209 See generally Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the Financial Services 
Industry: Convergence, Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 729, 739–43 (2011) (discussing how demutualization and corre-
sponding mergers result in convergence, consolidation, and conglomeration in the 
global financial services industry). 
210 Wilmarth, Road to Repeal, supra note 49, at 452–55. 
211 Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 49, at 975–81. 
212 See Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 10–11 (describing global competi-
tion as one of several reasons for increased popularity in demutualization in the 
life insurance market). 
213 Jung, supra note 209, at 739–42, 789–91. 
214 Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 11. 
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a firm’s employees.  Employees who could liquidate their own-
ership claims in public markets were less tightly tied to a firm 
and its financial future.215  This raised agency costs and dulled 
employee incentives to mitigate the risk-taking and protect the 
reputation of their employers.216 
Moreover, managers and employees of demutualized firms 
were now responsive to a new residual claimant—investors in 
public markers—rather than partners, depositors, or policy-
holders.217  Lynn Stout argued extensively that corporations 
need not pursue a shareholder wealth maximization norm and 
that they could take into account the interests of other stake-
holders.218  Nevertheless, even if managers could take into ac-
count a wide set of values, various structures encouraged them 
to focus on stock prices.219  Stock-based compensation, com-
bined with the prospect of proxy fights and takeovers, meant 
that managers and employees of corporate financial firms 
placed significant focus on short term stock prices.220  This 
focus can come at the expense of depositors, borrowers, policy-
holders, or consumers.  These incentives also slant in favor of 
increased financial institution risk-taking, including the kind 
that led to failures and bailouts of financial firms during the 
global financial crisis. 
II 
MUTUALIZING RISK ACROSS THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY: 
COMMUNITIES OF FATE AND CLEARINGHOUSES 
Colossal financial institution failures during the global cri-
sis and the severe costs they inflicted on taxpayers and the 
economy prompted Professor Saule Omarova to write her Wall 
Street as Community of Fate article.  Failures of certain entities 
also prompted Congress to write into the Dodd-Frank Act (i) 
requirements that derivatives be centrally cleared; and (ii) pro-
visions regulating the entities that conduct this central clearing 
215 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 407, 414–16 (2006) (describing the shareholder right of transferability and 
its implications). 
216 See 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 2096.10 (Callaghan & Co. 1917) (explaining these agency costs as a conse-
quence of the separation of ownership and control). 
217 See id. §§ 837.50, 848 (describing how a corporate director’s fiduciary du-
ties flow to the shareholders and corporation and not to each other). 
218 LYNN  STOUT, THE  SHAREHOLDER  VALUE  MYTH: HOW  PUTTING  SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 2–4, 27–29 (2012). 
219 Id. at 19–21. 
220 See generally id. at 63–69 (describing the reasons for the overemphasizing 
of short-term results and stock prices). 
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as market utilities.221  However, the governance structures of 
these modern clearing companies have changed radically in 
recent years.  Professor Saguato explores how the demutualiza-
tion of clearing companies allows profit-motivated sharehold-
ers to increase the risk-taking of these entities with potentially 
dramatic consequences for the financial institutions that use 
them and for financial markets writ large.222  Both Professor 
Omarova and Professor Saguato explore how mutual entities 
collectively owned by financial institutions can make the finan-
cial sector more stable and reduce the incidence and severity of 
financial crises.223 
A. Communities of Fate 
In Wall Street as Community of Fate, Saule Omarova pro-
poses creating new self-regulatory mechanisms for the finan-
cial sector that would address the increasingly complex 
financial products and activities of contemporary financial in-
stitutions.224  This complexity and the globalized nature of fi-
nancial institutions means government regulators constantly 
struggled to adapt their rules and supervision.225  Instead of 
relying on regulators to compete in an arms race, Professor 
Omarova advocates new self-regulatory structures.226  She de-
scribes the comparative advantage of private firms in identify-
ing and regulating risk thus: 
Private industry actors may be in the best position to identify 
and understand underlying trends in the increasingly com-
plex financial markets and to gather and analyze, in real 
time, information most relevant to systemic risk manage-
ment.  Unconstrained by matters of formal jurisdiction, pri-
vate firms are also better equipped to monitor and manage 
their activities and risks on a global basis as an integrated 
economic enterprise.  Leveraging this unique position of pri-
vate firms to control and regulate systemic risk in global 
financial markets can add to ongoing efforts to strengthen 
the government’s regulatory framework and create market-
based incentives for more prudent financial conduct.227 
221 See Saguato, supra note 7, at 609–13 (describing Dodd-Frank provisions 
governing central clearing of derivatives). 
222 Id. at 642–46. 
223 See id. at 604, 647–48; Omarova, supra note 4, at 474–75. 
224 Omarova, supra note 4, at 438–39, 474–75. 
225 Id. at 436–37. 
226 Id. at 490–91. 
227 Id. at 418–19. 
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Professor Omarova’s ideas look back to the old self-regulatory 
functions that U.S. stock and commodities exchanges played in 
capital markets before they themselves demutualized in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century.228  Her proposals also 
recall the old function of clearinghouses, such as the New York 
Clearinghouse.  Founded early in the nineteenth century as a 
central counterparty for banks to clear checks and settle finan-
cial accounts with one another, the New York Clearinghouse 
evolved into a kind of proto-central bank.229  In response to a 
series of banking panics in the middle of that century, the 
Clearinghouse developed a regime by which it would make 
emergency loans to member banks facing a liquidity shortfall. 
Borrowing banks would pledge securities as collateral for the 
loans.  The risk of the borrowing bank failing was thus mutual-
ized among all banks that were clearinghouse members.  This 
system gave assurances to depositors and other creditors of 
member banks that their loans enjoyed backup liquidity.230 
The clearinghouse pulled together member banks behind a col-
lective veil.  Creditors could not tell if individual banks faced a 
liquidity crisis, but did not care as the collective security pro-
vided by the clearinghouse sufficed to calm market nerves. 
This helped stave off or mitigate the severity of bank runs.231 
The creators of the Federal Reserve System modeled its 
own “lender of last resort” function after the New York Clearing-
house.232  The founding of the nation’s central bank in 1913 
rendered this function of the Clearinghouse largely obsolete. 
As with Professor Hansmann’s theory of bank regulation un-
dermining the competitive advantage of mutual banks,233 pub-
lic intervention in the area of emergency liquidity provision to 
banks also hollowed out the usefulness of a private sector orga-
nizational form as a regulatory tool. 
However, flash forwarding almost a century to the global 
financial crisis, the Federal Reserve found its own emergency 
lender of last resort functions outdated.  Large nonbanks that 
performed bank-like functions suffered their own liquidity cri-
ses.  Similarly, various capital markets, including securitiza-
tion, repurchase agreement (repo), asset-backed commercial 
228 See Karmel, supra note 5, at 368–70. 
229 See Gorton, supra note 6, at 278–81 (describing the clearing house as “an 
organized market—a single location where exchange between banks occurred”). 
230 Id. at 279–82. 
231 Id. at 277. 
232 See id. (noting that the Federal Reserve System “was simply the nationali-
zation of the private clearinghouse system”). 
233 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 255. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 43 28-JUL-20 17:16
839 2020] REMUTUALIZATION 
paper, and money market mutual funds, had come to offer 
bank like functions; they transformed illiquid assets into theo-
retically highly liquid and low risk investments that institu-
tional investors used as the equivalent of large deposit 
accounts.  However, losses on mortgage-related investments 
caused investors to flee these markets and fire sales to begin. 
These markets—which some scholars have collectively called 
the “shadow banking system”—in effect suffered shadow bank-
ing runs.234  The Federal Reserve creatively interpreted its 
emergency lending authority under the Federal Reserve Act to 
lend to non-banks and develop novel “liquidity facilities” to 
provide liquidity to these capital markets.235  However, upset 
with “bailouts” of the financial industry, Congress curbed the 
ability of the Federal Reserve to take these actions in the 
future.236 
Just as failures of public regulation raise the prospect of 
reviving the use of alternative organizational forms for individ-
ual banks and insurance companies, so too do the shortcom-
ings of central banks as prudential regulators and liquidity 
providers of last resort call for reexamining a possible role for 
the old clearinghouses.  These revived clearinghouses would 
differ drastically from the derivative clearinghouses created 
under the Dodd-Frank, which create a central intermediary for 
derivatives trading.237  Instead, new financial industry clear-
inghouses could provide emergency liquidity to nonbanks or to 
capital markets that engage in liquidity transformation and are 
thus subject to the risk of bank run dynamics.  Like the nine-
teenth-century clearinghouses, this type of organization would 
gather together financial institutions participating in these 
234 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run 
on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 428 (2012) (noting that repo and other short-term 
debt experienced runs during the financial crisis); Gary Gorton, Slapped in the 
Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at 14 , Nat’l Bur. 
Econ. Res. Working Paper (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882 [https://perma.cc/3KKZ-
JJ4L] (describing the “shadow banking system” as combining repurchase agree-
ments “with securitization . . . to accomplish the same function for firms [as 
traditional banking systems]”). 
235 Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal 
Reserve and the US Financial Crisis, in LAW REFORM AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 269, 
287 (Kern Alexander & Niamh Moloney eds. 2011). 
236 Id. at 299–303. 
237 For analyses of the roles played by the derivatives clearinghouses man-
dated by Dodd-Frank, see Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 446–47 (2013); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic 
Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 391–92 (2013). 
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markets.  Each member would agree to contribute capital to a 
fund which could then be used for: 
(a) emergency loans to members suffering a liquidity shock; 
(b) guarantees to investors purchasing instruments in a fro-
zen capital market; or 
(c) direct purchases of those instruments by the clearing-
house to unfreeze the market. 
These functions mirror the Federal Reserve and Treasury De-
partment interventions in 2008 and 2009 during the global 
financial crisis.  They also mimic the classic government inter-
ventions to stave off any banking crisis: emergency loans from 
a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and central bank 
open market operations.238 
This new clearinghouse would not have the statutory juris-
dictional limits faced by the Federal Reserve.  This solution 
would put the onus for monitoring and governing the risk-
taking of firms on the clearinghouse and its members.  These 
parties enjoy an informational advantage over government reg-
ulators in terms of understanding financial products and activ-
ities, their risks, and the way these products, activities, and 
risks evolve over time.  Moral hazard could be mitigated by the 
fact that each clearinghouse member would bear part of the 
risk of its activities.  Members would also worry about reputa-
tional loss for violating clearinghouse rules.  Reputational loss 
can be fatal in the banking industry, as confidence in a bank’s 
credible commitment to meet short term obligations is integral 
to its survival.239  Members could impose the informal sanc-
tions of refusing to conduct business with firms that flout rules 
or externalize too much risk on the clearinghouse. 
B. Clearinghouses and the Clearing of Securities and 
Derivatives 
Professor Saguato examines the modern clearinghouse, 
which is similar but distinct from the nineteenth-century 
banking clearinghouses described by Gorton.  Instead of mutu-
alizing risk industrywide in the midst of a bank panic,240 the 
modern clearinghouse or clearing company facilitates the 
238 ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND  FINANCIAL  REGULATION 454 (2014) 
(describing government crisis interventions in the shadow banking system as akin 
to traditional government interventions in bank runs); Kathryn Judge, The First 
Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016). 
239 See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Regulating Bank Reputation Risk, 54 GA. 
L. REV. 523, 539 (2020) (examining bank run risk). 
240 See Gorton, supra note 6, at 279–82. 
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clearing and settlement of securities and derivative trades.241 
By interposing itself as a central counterparty to all financial 
trades made on a given securities or derivatives exchange, a 
modern central clearing company reduces the risk that a party 
to any particular trade will suffer financial losses should the 
buyer or seller on the other side become insolvent.242  The 
clearing company assumes counterparty risk.  It protects itself 
by seeking to offset risks from multiple trades against each 
other and monitoring the risk of all traders that use its services 
(who are called “members”).243  The clearing company requires 
that members limit their trading risk exposure to the clearing 
company, post collateral to secure their settlement obligations 
to the clearinghouse, and contribute to a guaranty fund to 
protect the clearinghouse from losses when a member defaults 
on a trade.244 
Professor Saguato explains how clearing companies be-
came a centerpiece of post-crisis financial reform, including the 
landmark Dodd-Frank Act.  He draws attention to a less under-
stood trend: the demutualization of a large number of securi-
ties and derivatives clearinghouses.245  He argues that this 
demutualization comes at significant cost.  Investor-owned 
clearinghouses face strong pressure to take on more risk to 
earn greater returns for shareholders.246  This increases the 
risk for clearinghouse members and ultimately for global finan-
cial markets who would suffer massive but uncertain losses 
should a clearinghouse fail.247  Professor Saguato locates this 
risk in specific consequences of clearinghouse demutualiza-
tion, namely the transfer of control rights and residual claims 
to shareholders and away from users/members.  This transfer 
has perverse consequences, as it is the users/members who 
bear a higher degree of risk of clearinghouse failure.248 
He outlines several potential policy responses, all of which 
involve remutualizing control of a clearinghouse and the risk of 
clearinghouse failure.  These policies seek to give control rights 
over the clearinghouse to the parties that bear the greatest risk 
for a clearinghouse’s losses.  Professor Saguato outlines the 
advantages and drawbacks of multiple policy approaches in-
241 Saguato, supra note 7, at 604–12, 623–24. 
242 Id. at 604–05. 
243 Id. at 618–22. 
244 Id. at 618–22. 
245 Id. at 625–30. 
246 Saguato, supra note 7, at 635. 
247 Id. at 630–32. 
248 Id. at 641–42. 
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cluding the following: requiring clearinghouses to remutualize; 
imposing additional liability on shareholders of an investor-
owned clearinghouse; and creating hybrid governance struc-
tures to split control rights between shareholders and 
members.249 
C. Mutual Insurance for a Financial Sector 
Professors Omarova and Saguato consider a similar kind of 
problem: how to insure against widespread financial institu-
tion failure and systemic risk in important financial markets. 
Their proposals resemble one another in that both look to mu-
tualize risk among firms in a crucial segment of the financial 
services industry.  Professor Hansmann might have predicted 
their conclusions when he wrote about the advantage of the 
mutual form in insurance in bearing industrywide risks.  Pro-
fessor Hansmann writes: 
To the extent that the average loss level of an industry cannot 
be accurately predicted, an insurance company writing prop-
erty or liability insurance for that industry will bear risk that 
it cannot reduce by writing a large number of policies.  Such 
industrywide risk may be more efficiently borne by the firms 
in the industry than by an investor-owned insurance com-
pany.  Although the potential variation in industrywide 
losses may be large as a proportion of expected earnings for a 
company insuring the industry, they are likely to be much 
smaller relative to the earnings of the industry itself.  A mu-
tual company has the advantage that it eliminates those 
risks that are idiosyncratic to individual firms within the in-
dustry, while it passes back, pro rata, to all firms in the 
industry the risk of variance in the overall loss experience of 
the industry as a whole.250 
Mutualizing risk among financial firms does not necessa-
rily obviate the need for government regulation though. 
Whether by mistake or intention, financial firms within a mu-
tual could increase the overall magnitude or correlation of their 
collective risk-taking to a degree that would imperil financial 
markets and the broader economy.251  Government oversight of 
industry-wide mutuals thus remains crucial. 
249 Id. at 659–65. 
250 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 280. 
251 Levitin, supra note 237, at 451. 
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III 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
If alternative organizational forms can once again become 
powerful tools to limit excessive financial institution risk-tak-
ing, police market conduct and protect consumers, and pro-
mote access to credit and financial services, the question 
becomes how to promote the use of these forms.  Before an-
swering this question, it is helpful to summarize the different 
organizational forms discussed above.  The following table lists 
for each organizational form, the policy values the form pro-
motes and any related “remutualization” proposals advanced 
by legal scholars: 





Investment Excessive risk Personal liability 
Banks as taking/systemic risk; commitments for




(Painter and Hill) 
Credit unions Excessive risk-taking




Mutual Market conduct; 
insurance consumer financial 














A. The Limits of Private Ordering 
One approach to encouraging the use of these organiza-
tional forms and promoting remutualization would be to rely 
upon private ordering on the theory that firms organized as 
partnerships or mutuals would accrue reputational benefits. 
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For example, use of the partnership or mutual form might send 
a clear signal that the firm does not behave opportunistically 
with respect to its customers.  Private ordering is indeed the 
approach advocated by some legal scholars, such as Professors 
Claire Hill and Richard Painter in their proposal for “covenant 
banking.”252  They advocate a series of off-the-rack contractual 
provisions that investment banks could use to impose personal 
liability on crucial, well-compensated employees.253  Professors 
Hill and Painter believe that firms that opt into this contractual 
regime will benefit by sending a clear signal to their creditors, 
investors, and customers that the firm’s most important per-
sonnel stand behind the firm’s actions.254  This credible com-
mitment would signal that the firm can be trusted to make 
prudent decisions, guard its solvency, and avoid fines for op-
portunistic behavior vis-à-vis customers. 
The evidence that private ordering alone will suffice is, 
however, weak.  Investment banks have not opted for increased 
personal liability for their employees.  There is scant evidence 
that insurance companies or banks are converting back to the 
mutual form.  The one piece of evidence that market forces 
might play a small role came in the 2011 “Bank Transfer Day” 
and “Dump Your Bank Day” protest actions organized by con-
sumer groups and the Occupy Wall Street movement.255  In 
encouraging customers of large banks to move their deposits to 
smaller community banks and credit unions, these groups did 
enjoy a measure of success.  In October 2011, 650,000 custom-
ers joined credit unions, more than the number who joined in 
all of 2010.  That same year, Bank of America sparked con-
sumer outrage with a new $5 debit card fee, and, in the one-
month period afterwards, approximately $4.5 billion in depos-
its moved from large banks to U.S. credit unions.  However, 
economists saw these developments as largely symbolic given 
the vast number of accounts and deposits still held by large 
financial conglomerates. 
Private ordering alone is unlikely to trigger a shift to part-
nership and mutual forms for several reasons.  First, reputa-
252 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 8. 
253 See generally id. at 149–64 (describing the features of different specific 
covenant forms). 
254 See id. at 164–65 (arguing that “many private actors who have a stake in 
and interact with banks should benefit from a covenant banking regime.”). 
255 Gloria Goodale, Bank Transfer Day: How Much Impact Did It Have?, CHRIS-
TIAN  SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/ 
2011/1107/Bank-Transfer-Day-How-much-impact-did-it-have [https:// 
perma.cc/MF9P-EWCA]. 
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tion may not adequately discipline large financial 
conglomerates because these firms operate in markets that are 
far from competitive.  For example, the high degree of market 
concentration, particularly in underwriting and advisory ser-
vices, derivatives, trading, and other specialized investment 
banking businesses, dulls the negative competitive impact on 
an investment bank from scandals, including those involving 
allegations that the bank acted opportunistically against cus-
tomer interests.256 
Second, private ordering alone is unlikely to yield the opti-
mal use of partnership and mutual organizational forms for the 
same reasons that markets fail to produce optimal levels of 
systemic risk, consumer protection, and consumer access to 
financial services in the first place.  Market failures pervade 
financial services.  For example, systemic risk arises when the 
failure of one of more banks or other financial institutions has 
severe negative spillover effects on other firms, entire financial 
markets, or the larger economy.257  The parties impacted can-
not adequately protect themselves via contract or investment 
diversification.  Banks and other financial firms thus do not 
bear the full cost of their risky investments and their financial 
failure.  It is unlikely that market forces alone will push these 
firms toward an organizational form that internalizes and 
reduces this systemic risk. 
Similarly, market forces may not produce an optimal level 
of consumer protection given that consumers suffer from 
asymmetric information258 and behavioral biases.259  These 
dynamics impede consumers from choosing products that offer 
the lowest overall cost and highest benefits and leave them 
prone to hidden fees and other costs.260  Given the limits to 
consumer financial decision-making, financial firms that chose 
256 See, e.g., Emilie R. Feldman, A Basic Quantification of the Competitive 
Implications of the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 29 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193, 208–09 
(2006) (concluding that the Department of Justice punishment of Enron’s Arthur 
Andersen only “maintain[ed] competition . . . in the already-concentrated ac-
counting industry”). 
257 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 371–72. 
258 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 276–77. 
259 Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 11, at 39. 
260 See, e.g., id. (describing how firms can take advantage of biased consumers 
with contracts offering incentives, but also generating greater payments); 
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 228 (noting that, as a result of asymmetric informa-
tion, customers may be “in a peculiarly poor position to determine, with reasona-
ble cost or effort, the quality or the quantity of the services they receive from a 
firm”). 
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mutual forms to attract customers may not enjoy socially opti-
mal results. 
B. Tax Subsidies 
Tax policy provides one vehicle to subsidize mutual compa-
nies providing this access.  In addition, tax preferences for in-
vestment banks organized as partnerships and banks and 
insurance companies organized as mutuals can promote the 
use of these organizational forms.  Tax preferences can subsi-
dize not only wider consumer access but also the other policy 
benefits offered by these types of organizations: reducing sys-
temic risk and promoting consumer protection.  Although tax 
scholars routinely object to the use of taxation as an instru-
ment for new policy objectives,261 remutualization is closely 
connected to traditional tax policy concerns for two reasons. 
First, many mutual banks and lenders historically enjoyed 
tax breaks because they were organized as nonprofit or quasi-
non-profit entities.262  Likewise, historically, the Internal Reve-
nue Code contained tax preferences for mutual insurance com-
panies.263 These tax preferences for life insurers were reduced 
in 1959,264 and their elimination at the end of the twentieth 
century provided an impetus for the wave of demutualization 
described above.265  Restoring these tax advantages would be 
justified by the benefits that mutual banks and insurance com-
panies provide in terms of more consumer-friendly financial 
products and greater consumer access.  In many respects, 
these benefits make these mutual entities more like nonprofit 
entities than their for-profit/investor-owned counterparts. 
Second, the reduction in systemic risk that comes with the 
partnership and mutual form also argues for tax preferences. 
Reductions in the systemic risk caused by financial firms that 
are organized as partnerships or mutual companies translates 
into lower spillover costs imposed on financial markets and the 
macroeconomy.266  It also means a lower impact on the public 
261 See, e.g., Hearing on “Tax: Fundamentals in Advance of Reform” Before the 
S. Comm. On Finance, 110th Cong. 9–10 (2008) (statement of Jason Furman, 
Senior Fellow and Director of the Hamilton Project, The Brookings Institute) (as-
serting that the concept of tax neutrality, the notion that taxes should be levied 
without regard for policy goals, is widely accepted in principle). 
262 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 244. 
263 Id. at 275. 
264 Id. at 275–76. 
265 HANSMANN, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
266 See generally Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 373 (noting that a firm 
may reduce loss by examining the risk that other similarly situated market par-
ticipants face). 
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fisc.  This results not only from the reduced need for govern-
ment interventions to rescue failing firms and frozen financial 
markets, but also from avoiding the losses to government reve-
nue during financial crises.  Reduced impacts on the govern-
ment fisc justifies lower tax rates for investment banks 
organized as partnerships and banks and insurance compa-
nies organized as mutuals compared to their respective coun-
terparts that are organized as corporations. 
C. Regulatory Preferences 
Policymakers can also grant regulatory preferences to part-
nerships and mutually owned financial companies to lower the 
regulatory “tax rate” on these firms.  Of course, a lower regula-
tory tax on these firms operates as a regulatory tax premium on 
firms organized as corporations.  Regulatory preferences might 
offer the most desirable policy approach for encouraging 
remutualization. 
Regulatory preferences should ideally come in the policy 
area in which the partnership or mutual company outperforms 
their corporate counterparts.  For example, to the extent that 
investment bank partnerships pose less systemic risk than cor-
porate firms, they can and should be subject to lighter pruden-
tial regulations such as lower regulatory capital requirements 
and lower leverage requirements.  Activities restrictions, such 
as the Volcker Rule prohibition on proprietary trading,267 could 
also be relaxed for these investment banks.  Investment bank 
partnerships would face internal rather than external disincen-
tives to take excessive risks. 
One of the advantages of using the organizational form as a 
regulatory tool is that it may offer greater social benefits or 
reduced social costs compared to traditional financial regula-
tions.  As noted in Part IV below, by creating structures for 
liability and control and by redefining the residual claimant, 
the organizational form transforms the incentives of the firm’s 
owners, management, and employees.  These changed incen-
tives require less government-imposed process-based compli-
ance rules. Historically, this logic prompted financial 
267 Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. 
J. LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011) (offering rationale for Volcker Rule provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act). 
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regulators to grant more favorable regulatory treatment to mu-
tually owned companies.268 
In several circumstances, policymakers not only should 
grant regulatory preferences to partnerships or mutual compa-
nies, but they may be under a statutory mandate to do so.  For 
example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Improve-
ment Act requires that the Federal Deposit Insurance Company 
base the premia it charges for deposit insurance on the specific 
risk level of a bank failing.269  If depositor-owned banks pose 
less of a risk of failure,270 then they should pay less for deposit 
insurance. 
Regulatory preferences do pose a measurement challenge. 
Policymakers must determine the level of reduced systemic 
risk, enhanced consumer protection, or wider consumer access 
that a particular organizational form offers compared to corpo-
rate entities.  However, this measurement challenge is by no 
means insurmountable, and it already permeates all of finan-
cial regulation.  Moreover, empirical data on the policy benefits 
offered by particular organizational forms, such as reduced 
failure rates by mutual banks and savings and loan associa-
tions compared to investor-owned counterparts,271 provides a 
starting point for analysis. 
D. Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Civil Settlements 
by Regulators 
Policymakers can use more direct means to encourage 
remutualization.  In the last two decades, deferred prosecution 
agreements in criminal cases272 and settlement agreements in 
civil lawsuits brought by regulators273 have become important 
268 See Hansmann, supra note 42, at 135–38 (exploring the historical record of 
the mutual form). 
269 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
271 See id. 
272 See generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGU-
LATE  CORPORATE  CONDUCT 38–68, 228 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow 
eds., 2011) (describing the positive shift in government use of deferred prosecu-
tion agreements (DPA) as a means of incentivizing structural change toward com-
pliance amongst corporations); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of 
Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 457–60 (2014) (noting that DPAs have 
become a pillar of white-collar criminal enforcement in recent decades). 
273 The 2003 settlement among regulators (including the New York State At-
torney General and the SEC) and ten investment banks imposing new rules on 
stock analyst practices at those firms represented a landmark in using civil settle-
ments by regulators to impose new rules on the financial firms.  For a description 
of the settlement, see Stephen Labaton, Wall Street Settlement: The Overview; 10 
Wall Street Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2003), 
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regulatory tools.  Prosecutors and regulatory agencies have 
used these agreements to impose new legal requirements on 
financial institutions albeit via contract rather than by statute 
or rulemaking.274  Prosecutors or agencies might use this 
power to require a financial institution accused of breaking the 
law to convert to an alternative organizational form. 
There is a certain symmetry to this use of prosecutorial or 
civil regulatory power.  For example, an investment bank facing 
serious accusations of defrauding customers might be required 
to convert to a partnership on the theory that that organiza-
tional form better aligns the firm’s incentives with those of 
customers.  Similarly, a large bank accused of widespread 
abuses of depositors or borrowers might be required to mutual-
ize given evidence that that organizational form better protects 
consumers. 
Requiring conversion or mutualization is a drastic remedy, 
but much financial institutions malfeasance is drastic.  Fines, 
even when they total billions of dollars, might simply represent 
the cost of doing business for large financial conglomerates.275 
Using the organizational form to restructure a firm’s incentives 
would save prosecutors or regulators from having to monitor 
compliance compared to settlements that impose new govern-
ance processes or procedures.  The public would have greater 
assurance that the settlement would fundamentally alter a 
firm’s incentives rather than represent a weak and ephemeral 




Detailed mandates for compliance programs have now become a routine and 
central part of civil settlements between regulators and financial firms (as well as 
nonfinancial firms). See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Com-
pliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2086–91 (2016). The history of civil settle-
ments mandating compliance programs dates to well before the global financial 
crisis or the Enron scandal. Cf. F. Joseph Warin & Jason S. Schwartz, Corporate 
Compliance Programs as a Component of Plea Agreements and Civil and Adminis-
tration Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71, 73–83 (1998) (exploring historical case 
examples of civil settlements leading to compliance programs). 
274 PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 272, at 75–76. 
275 E.g., Peter J. Henning, Guilty Pleas and Heavy Fines Seem to Be Cost of 
Business for Wall St., N.Y. TIMES  DEALBOOK (May 20, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/guilty-pleas-and-heavy-
fines-seem-to-be-cost-of-business-for-wall-st.html  [https://perma.cc/NNR8-
G6VT]  (documenting criminal and civil settlements in which financial conglomer-
ates are repeat offenders). 
276 For a magisterial empirical analysis and critique of the effectiveness of 
prosecutorial settlements with financial and other corporations, see BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
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nificant improvement over the successful prosecution of finan-
cial firms.  As the Arthur Andersen indictment in the Enron 
scandal demonstrates, criminal prosecution could lead to the 
demise of firms, which might reduce competition in already 
oligopolistic industries.277 
E. Promoting Clearinghouses 
Selecting appropriate policy tools to mutualize systemic 
risk via clearinghouses presents particularly thorny questions. 
Centralizing systemic risk may exacerbate the “too-big-to-fail” 
problem and heighten rather than lessen reliance on the gov-
ernment safety net.278  However, the systemic risk posed by 
shadow banking markets, sketched out in Part II above, de-
mands to be addressed.  Bank-run dynamics in repo and other 
wholesale funding markets, asset-backed securities markets, 
and any other capital markets that perform liquidity or matur-
ity transformation remains a persistent, pervasive, and signifi-
cant threat to financial stability.  Policymakers and scholars 
have urged action to reduce reliance by banks and financial 
conglomerates on these markets as a source of funding.279 
This might be accomplished through a mix of regulatory re-
strictions and Pigouvian taxes on bank leverage or financial 
transaction taxes.  Consistent with the regulatory preference 
approach outlined above, these regulations or taxes might be 
lightened in the case of entities and activities that are subject 
to a clearinghouse’s support and are governed by the clearing-
house’s rules. 
This might be combined with explicit prohibitions on the 
government safety net extending to a clearinghouse (and cer-
tainly to firms and markets not covered by the clearinghouse) 
of the kind Congress placed in the Dodd-Frank Act.  However, 
that sort of statutory restriction may not represent a fully cred-
ible commitment.  Faced with a massive financial crisis, a fu-
ture Congress might conclude it has no attractive option other 
277 See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the 
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107–110 (2006) (criticizing 
prosecution of accounting firm); Feldman, supra note 256, at 205–09 (estimating 
competitive impact of firm leaving auditor market). 
278 Concerns with centralizing systemic risk have animated numerous criti-
ques of the other form of clearinghouse—the institutions that centralize the clear-
ing and settlement of derivatives trades. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 237, at 
458–61, 463–65 (analyzing the comparative critique of OTC derivatives). 
279 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at Ass’n of American Law Schools 6 (June 6, 2014), https://fraser.st 
louisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/bog_members_ 
statements/tarullo20140609a.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX9S-TNWB]. 
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than to relax the restriction.  Moreover, policymakers might 
search for creative workarounds.  On the other hand, should 
the restriction effectively bind the government, it might remove 
any effective intervention to stave off a full-blown financial cri-
sis.  These sorts of dilemmas argue for proceeding with extreme 
caution with any efforts to mutualize risk in a clearinghouse. 
A successful clearinghouse or any mutualization of sys-
temic risk among financial firms would not obviate the need for 
government involvement and regulation.  The prospect of finan-
cial firms collectively using a clearinghouse to externalize sys-
temic risk on the government in a game of chicken means that 
regulators must closely oversee the internal rules the clearing-
house uses to govern the risk-taking of its members.280  In-
deed, when advocating for mutualizing systemic risk among 
financial conglomerates and transforming Wall Street into a 
“community of fate,” Professor Omarova used the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission’s approach to self-regulatory 
organizations as a model.281  These organizations pass and en-
force rules to govern member financial firms, but their deci-
sions are subject to review by the SEC.282 
F. Less than Full Remutualization: Hybrid Forms 
Policymakers might conclude that financial institutions 
should enjoy some of the benefits of investor-owned corpora-
tions, including the enhanced ability to raise large amounts of 
capital.  Policymakers might then choose to promote financial 
institutions taking hybrid forms.  For example, investment 
banks owned by investors might require key employees to hold 
a large collective “partnership” stake.  Some investment banks, 
such as Goldman Sachs, did just this: they chose to retain at 
least some elements of partnership compensation and nomen-
clature even after they converted to a corporation and con-
ducted an IPO.283 
280 This too has clear parallels with derivatives clearinghouses.  Scholars have 
argued that derivatives clearinghouse can successfully reduce systemic risk only 
with robust rules, such as position limits and margin requirements, that limit the 
clearinghouse’s exposure to member firms.  Levitin, supra note 237, at 454–56, 
460–64. 
281 Omarova, supra note 4, at 483–86. 
282 Id. at 417–18. 
283 Susanne Craig, How Goldman Makes (and Unmakes) Its Partners, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/how-
goldman-makes-and-unmakes-its-partners/ [https://perma.cc/KR7J-7VYN] 
(“When it was private, the partners were the owners, sharing in the profits, and in 
some cases having to put in money to shore up losses.  To retain that team spirit 
as a public company, Goldman continued to name partners.”). 
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Professors Hill and Painter criticize Goldman Sachs for 
breaking laws and taking advantage of clients throughout their 
book.284  This underscores the messiness of hybrid forms.  If 
policymakers pursue a hybrid approach, they should specify 
off-the-rack forms with carefully designed control rights, liabil-
ity mechanisms, and residual claims.  The potential for games-
manship of hybrid forms and conflicts among various 
stakeholders reduces the attractiveness of attempts to split the 
baby of organizational entity choice.  There is considerable 
value in assigning clear ultimate control rights, liability, and 
residual claims to a single group. 
IV 
CRITIQUES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF 
REMUTUALIZATION 
Promoting remutualization—the shift toward investment 
banks as partnerships and banks and insurance companies as 
mutual companies—faces potential challenges and raises po-
tential objections beyond the question of designing appropriate 
policy instruments.  This Part IV examines several potential 
downsides to remutualization, but it concludes that the use of 
organizational form—partnerships and mutual companies—as 
a tool of financial regulation offers numerous comparative ad-
vantages vis-à-vis traditional financial rules. 
Returning to Professor Hansmann’s framework, the opti-
mal organizational form would minimize the sum of the follow-
ing: (i) market contracting costs for nonowner patrons of a firm; 
and (ii) ownership costs for those patrons who are the firm’s 
residual claimants.285  This Article has thus far largely focused 
on evidence of the benefits of mutual forms in terms of reduc-
ing the risk that financial institutions will: 
• take excessive risk, fail, and generate spillover costs for 
customers, counterparties, and financial markets; 
• exploit customers and consumers; or 
• break laws or engage in misconduct. 
If a firm’s clients, customers, and counterparties or partici-
pants in broader financial markets are not owners of the firms, 
284 See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 100–05 (“To put the problem in 
the simplest terms, the interests of the client continue to be sidelined in the way 
the firm operates and thinks about making money.”). 
285 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48 (discussing both costs of market con-
tracting and costs of ownership). 




853 2020] REMUTUALIZATION 
they would face difficulties in contracting with firms in the 
market to reduce these risks. 
However, the other side of the ledger must also be consid-
ered.  Subpart IV.A below considers the costs of ownership as-
sociated with partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives. 
Subparts IV.B and IV.C then examine whether owners of these 
alternative forms could really oversee large and complex mod-
ern financial firms. Subpart IV.D outlines the comparative ad-
vantages to the organizational form as a regulatory tool relative 
to other traditional forms of financial regulation. Subpart IV.E 
briefly looks at the impact of organizational form on institu-
tional culture within a firm.  Subpart IV.F examines other po-
tential public costs that come with economic clubs, namely 
anticompetitive and discriminatory behavior. 
A. The Costs of Ownership for Partnerships, Mutuals, and 
Cooperatives (and the Comparative Benefits of 
Investor-Owned Corporations) 
The costs of ownership of a firm include: agency costs/the 
costs of mitigating managerial opportunism; costs of reduced 
diversification for owners; and costs of raising capital.  Each of 
these is examined below in turn. 
1. Agency Costs/Managerial Opportunism 
Demutualization in the financial services sector from the 
1970s onwards coincided with a rising concern in elite aca-
demic, policymaking, and business circles about agency costs 
in the U.S. economy.286  Converting partnerships and mutuals 
to investor-owned corporations, aligning the incentives of cor-
porate management with shareholders, and promoting share-
holder wealth maximization became dominant legal and 
economic policy norms.287  Partnerships, mutuals, and cooper-
atives may appear at first blush to have a comparative disad-
vantage to investor-owned corporations in terms of mitigating 
management opportunism.  Shareholders in corporations have 
286 The agency cost lens for analyzing business associations reached new 
prominence with Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976); see also Carson et al., supra note 159, at 17 (“[D]emutualization may be 
motivated by attempts to control associated agency costs . . .”). 
287 Supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text. See generally HANSMANN, 
supra note 12, at 35–38, 40 (providing historical and analytical framework for 
changes in organizational form); HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 105–06 (provid-
ing historical context for investment banks switching from partnerships to public 
corporations). 
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greater ability to discipline management by selling shares and 
exiting the firm, and corporations can pay managers in stock. 
Partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives create structural ob-
stacles to owners entering and exiting firms.288  Owners also 
face daunting collective action problems in monitoring and 
controlling management.  However, Professor Hansmann ar-
gues that agency costs concerns are partially mitigated by the 
identity of the residual claimant of partnerships, mutuals, and 
cooperatives.  Management of these firms may shirk but they 
have less incentive to exploit owners because there is no other 
residual claimant—particularly no profit-motivated capital 
providers—to favor.289  As noted above, evidence from mutual 
insurance companies does not indicate that mutual firms un-
derperform compared to investor-owned firms in terms of 
prices offered to consumers or other financial metrics.290 
2. Diversification 
The ownership stake of partnerships, mutuals, and coop-
eratives represents a bundled financial interest.  Partnership 
stakes essentially combine an investment of capital with an 
investment of labor (i.e., an equity ownership stake plus an 
implicit salary).291  Owners of a bank or insurance mutual re-
ceive an ownership stake bundled together with one or more 
financial products (e.g., a bank deposit, access to credit and 
payments services, or an insurance policy).292  Members of a 
mutualized financial clearinghouse possess an equity stake 
coupled with rights to access the clearinghouse’s platform.293 
Were these interests to be decoupled, these respective stake-
holders could still receive the respective financial product or 
service, but invest their capital in other financial assets.  How-
ever, because these various interests are bundled, the owners 
of these different firms incur an opportunity cost, particularly a 
288 E.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP  ACT §§ 402, 701 (1997), https://www.uniform 
laws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey= 
D4bd53b5-0e2a-d71e-6d84-66a26e296324&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
LX32-S7Y8] (describing model law provisions governing admission and disassoci-
ation of partners).  Obtaining an ownership stake a mutual insurance company 
requires purchasing a policy, and surrendering or cancelling that policy ends that 
ownership relationship. About Mutual Insurance Companies, NAT’L ASSOC. MUTUAL 
INS. COS., https://www.namic.org/about/mutuals [https://perma.cc/R8RB-
FHCH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
289 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273. 
290 Supra notes 163–74 and accompanying text. 
291 Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, supra note 42, at 292–96 (describing 
economics of investment bank partnerships and other “worker-owned” firms). 
292 See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–70. 
293 Saguato, supra note 7, at 647–48. 
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lost opportunity to diversify their investment portfolio.294  This 
particular cost of ownership inheres with the traditional part-
nership, mutual, or cooperative form. 
3. Costs of Raising Capital/Capital Needs 
The more important benefits that come with an investor-
owned corporation—and the costs that come with the partner-
ship, mutual, or cooperative form—relate to the ability to raise 
significant amounts of capital.295  The question then becomes 
for what purposes is the additional capital made possible by 
the corporate form actually used. 
As noted above, demutualization enabled capital to be 
raised for investments in technology.  Some of this technology 
benefitted the clients and customers of a demutualized firm. 
Some technological investment was necessary for financial 
firms to survive.296  Yet scholars have asked trenchant ques-
tions regarding how much of technological innovation by finan-
cial institutions in the last four decades has yielded a net social 
benefit.  Much investment in technology may have represented 
wasteful arms races that increased and camouflaged financial 
institution risk-taking, systemic risk generation, and con-
sumer exploitation.297 
Demutualized firms also used capital to compete and re-
store eroded profit margins.  Financial institutions, such as 
investment banks, switched to the corporate form as regulatory 
changes reduced their profit margins and induced them to 
enter riskier business lines.298  However, whether these 
changes in the business models of financial firms represented a 
net social gain proves debatable.  Demutualization may have 
added unnecessary fuel to the competitive bonfire in which 
financial institutions pushed one another to take greater risk, 
at the expense of customers and taxpayers.  Financial firms 
sought capital to compete firms in the same financial sector, in 
other financial sectors, or across borders.  Demutualization in 
each of investment banking, banking, and insurance may have 
created a competitive spiral which drove more risk-taking and 
more demutualization within industries.  We should be cau-
tious about whether efforts to remutualize the industry can 
294 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 281–82. 
295 See Viswanathan & Cummins, supra note 186, at 415–16. 
296 Supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
297 For a magisterial consideration of the purposes, benefits, and costs of new 
technologies and innovation in financial services, see CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND 
THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE (2017). 
298 Supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
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completely reverse transformational changes in banking, in-
vestment banking, and insurance.299 
These transformational changes had ostensible bene-
fits.300  They resulted in financial conglomerates that could 
cross-sell products to consumers.  In addition to having the 
capital to acquire firms in other financial sectors, investor-
owned corporations do not face a structural impediment to 
selling a range of financial products that mutuals do.  As noted 
above, mutual banks and insurance companies thrive when 
owners have homogenized interests.  A mutual that offers a 
range of products and services would have a heterogeneous set 
of residual claimants with conflicting interests.301  Further-
more, larger investment banks, banks, and insurance compa-
nies could achieve economies of scale and diversify risk, 
whereas investment bank partnerships and bank and insur-
ance mutuals face constraints on their growth.302 
However, a dark side exists to all these benefits enjoyed by 
investor-owned financial firms.  Financial institutions may face 
increased conflicts of interest when operating different busi-
ness lines and selling different products to customers and cli-
ents.303  Larger size translates into more severe systemic 
consequences when a firm fails.  At the extreme, large financial 
conglomerates create “too-big-to-fail” concerns.304  The flip side 
of diversification across asset classes and financial markets is 
the creation of transmission lines for financial contagion: 
losses suffered by financial firms in one market can spread to 
other markets.305 Conglomerates also create opportunities for 
subsidiaries to improperly transfer government guaranties and 
299 For an overview of this transformation, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, 
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
300 See id. at 223. 
301 Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
302 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 278–82. 
303 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance 
Failures at Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases 
of Enron and Worldcom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 97 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2007). 
304 E.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS (2004) (discussing the nature and costs of, and solutions to, “too big to 
fail” concerns). 
305 Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law Im-
proved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L. 
REV. 89, 124–25 (2015). 
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subsidies to one another, leaving taxpayers ultimately respon-
sible for the firm’s risk-taking.306 
In sum, whether the constraints on capital raising that 
come with alternative entity forms represents a net social cost 
or a benefit is not clear cut.  This calculation depends on judg-
ments on the social costs and benefits of how financial firms 
have deployed the additional capital that they raised thanks to 
demutualization.  Enhanced technology, competition in new 
lines of business, and conglomeration are not unalloyed goods. 
B. Complexity and Information 
In an investment bank partnership, changing the residual 
claimant alone may not be enough to curtail excessive risk-
taking.  A partner may conclude that her or his personal ex-
pected benefits from a risky transaction may outweigh her or 
his expected share of the partnership’s liability from that trans-
action.  The partnership may thus need to impose not only 
indemnification provisions on partners to protect itself from the 
actions of individual partners, but also systems for partners to 
monitor and control each other’s behavior. 
This leads to another potential concern, namely whether 
these systems would work in modern financial conglomerates 
which have a wide array of business lines that are often global 
in scope.  It might be unrealistic to expect even sophisticated 
investment bankers using modern tools of risk management to 
monitor and understand other business lines, which might be 
conducted in far-flung offices in any number of jurisdictions, in 
detail sufficient to detect excessive risk-taking or misconduct. 
This concern is mitigated by several factors.  If this concern 
applies to investment bank insiders, it applies doubly to regu-
lators charged with supervising and examining firms.  The 
question is not whether the organizational form addresses mar-
ket failures in an absolute sense, but rather whether it is an 
improvement on other policy approaches.  Inside partners pos-
sess comparative advantages over outside regulators in several 
respects.  These include better access to information on the 
firm, the ability to vet new hires closely, and a range of informal 
mechanisms to police each other’s conduct based on social 
relationships.307 
306 Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1753–55 
(2011). 
307 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 96–97. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 62 28-JUL-20 17:16
858 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:797 
C. Regulating Size 
Moreover, if the members of an investment bank partner-
ship are uncomfortable with the risks posed by the size and 
complexity of a modern investment banking firm, they may 
elect to simplify the firm.  This applies equally to mutual banks 
or insurance companies.  Smaller firms with less opaque and 
complex operations may pose less of a risk for the partners as 
well as less systemic risk.  More broadly, remutualization can 
address concerns with the size and complexity of financial 
firms, including the “too-big-to-fail” problem.  If the conversion 
of investment banks, mutual banks, and insurance companies 
to publicly held corporations turbocharged the ability of these 
firms to raise capital, acquire other firms, and expand opera-
tions globally, then reverting to the older organizational form 
would throw this process into reverse.  Partnerships and mu-
tual companies will not be able to attract new equity owners as 
easily.  Prospective partners in an investment bank may be 
concerned about liability exposure.  Mutual companies can at-
tract new equity only by signing new customers. 
Remutualization offers several comparative advantages 
over other solutions to limit the size of financial institutions.  It 
avoids thorny questions of defining the appropriate metric for 
measuring inappropriate size and drawing the line for what 
constitutes “too big.”  No legal rules limiting or taxing size also 
mean no industry gamesmanship of those rules.  Remutualiza-
tion also obviates the need for costly litigation to break up 
conglomerates. 
D. The Comparative Advantage of Organizational Form as 
Regulatory Tool 
This same logic explains the comparative advantages that 
the use of alternative organizational forms—partnerships, mu-
tual companies, and cooperatives—enjoys over other forms of 
financial regulation more generally.  The organizational form 
acts structurally, by changing incentives of firms internally 
rather than through external pressure.  It reorders the organic 
relationships among different patrons or constituencies of a 
firm.  As a regulatory tool, the organizational form does not 
require specifying the precise favored or disfavored conduct to 
be subject to a formal legal rule.  It likewise requires neither 
specifying the desired level of conduct (e.g., the level of firm 
risk-taking, the cost of financial products to consumers, or the 
level of consumer access to financial services) nor the level of a 
regulatory tax.  Accordingly, it is less subject to regulatory arbi-
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trage than traditional forms of prudential and consumer finan-
cial regulation.  Managers have less incentive to exploit 
loopholes because the entity form embeds changed incentives 
into the very structure of legal relationships within the firm. 
The organizational form relies on the informational advantages 
of equity owners or managers over government regulators in 
making decisions on desirable levels of risk-taking and con-
sumer protection. 
The organizational form also has advantages over compli-
ance regimes.  As a regulatory tool, alternative organizational 
forms do not require determining whether particular proce-
dures will achieve a substantive policy result or monitoring 
whether those procedures are being followed. Instead, it cre-
ates a set of relationships among owners and managers using 
liability rules, control mechanisms, and residual claimants. 
Owners and managers can then craft more particularized gov-
ernance structures and make decisions between themselves. 
The use of partnerships and mutual companies also has 
advantages over other corporate governance-based proposals 
for financial reform.308  These organizational forms do not re-
quire experiments with creating new fiduciary duties for man-
agers of the firm or new beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, questions in corporate law abound on the effective-
ness of fiduciary duties in performing their crucial current role 
in mitigating agency costs in the management-shareholder re-
lationship.  These questions would only multiply should the 
scope of fiduciary duties be expanded to include reducing sys-
temic risk or serving other stakeholders.  Effective use of corpo-
rate fiduciary duties to address financial regulatory concerns 
such as systemic risk would require rethinking core corporate 
law doctrines, such as the business judgment rule, in funda-
mental ways.  Corporate governance solutions might also re-
quire resolving conflicting interests of different stakeholders in 
an investor-owned corporation. 
Professors Hill and Painter are not alone among legal 
scholars in proposing new liability regimes to curb financial 
institution risk-taking and misconduct.  For example, some 
scholars have proposed reforms that would impose additional 
308 See generally David Min, Balancing the Governance of Financial Institu-
tions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 743 (2017) (surveying corporate governance-based 
proposals to mitigate systemic risk posed by banks).  For one example of a propo-
sal that would impose new duties on management, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Mis-
alignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22 
(2016) (advocating imposing a “public governance” duty on management of finan-
cial institutions in addition to fiduciary duties). 
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losses or liability on executives or shareholders in the event of a 
bank’s insolvency.309  The use of partnership and mutual 
forms, however, relies not only on control or personal liability 
mechanisms, but, moreover, on changing the identity of the 
residual claimant.  The identity of the residual claimant plays a 
powerful but subsurface role in changing the incentives within 
the firm. 
E. The Importance of Culture 
The organizational form not only changes the incentives 
within the firm—the cost-benefit analysis conducted by own-
ers, managers, and employees—it can also change the firm’s 
culture.  Indeed, this cultural dynamic lies at the core of the 
analysis of Professors Hill and Painter on the consequences of 
the shift in the investment banking industry from partnerships 
to publicly traded corporations.  They make a compelling case 
that the partnership structure either created or reinforced a 
culture of prudent risk-taking and elevating client interests.310 
Reverting to partnerships and mutual companies, with the lia-
bility rules, control mechanisms, and different residual claim-
ants that come with those organizational forms, could foster 
the restoration of these older social norms.  It is important to 
temper expectations, however, on how dramatically or quickly 
a firm or industry’s culture or norms can change. 
F. Clubs, Competition, and Exclusion 
Partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives represent forms 
of economic clubs.  These differ markedly from investor-owned 
corporations with respect to ease of entry.  The price of admis-
sion to ownership of a publicly traded corporation is the price 
per share.  By contrast, alternative entity forms may have elab-
309 E.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
409, 428 (2012) (proposing scheme in which bank shareholders would have op-
tion of either reducing firm leverage or assuming liability for bank failure); Rich-
ard Ridyard, Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model: Using Double Liability 
to Mitigate Excessive Risk-Taking, 2 UCL J.L. & JURIS. 141 (2013) (advocating 
return to earlier historical rules in which bank shareholders are liable upon bank 
insolvency for twice their capital contribution); James Si Zeng, Internal and Exter-
nal Shareholder Liability in the Financial Industry: A Comparative Approach, 37 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 285 (2017) (surveying post-crisis legal rules that directly or 
indirectly increase shareholder liability for financial institutions). 
A large number of other proposals would address systemic risk by creative 
changes to the forms of compensation for financial institution executives. See, 
e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1821 (2012) (proposing paying executives in debt that would convert into 
equity upon trigger event linked to firm’s deteriorating financial health). 
310 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 95–101. 
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orate mechanisms to restrict entry of new owners.311  This has 
social benefits when owners who would take excessive risks, 
exploit customers, or break laws are kept out of the firm.  How-
ever, exclusion may also occur for anticompetitive or discrimi-
natory reasons.312  Alternative organizational forms, such as 
mutuals, flourish when members have homogenous inter-
ests.313  Unfortunately, some alternative organizational forms 
have also perpetuated unacceptable kinds of homogeneity 
among members.  Entity forms could serve as vehicles for dis-
crimination.  For example, investment bank partnerships de-
pended upon and cultivated deep social relationships both 
among partners and between partners and clients.  Histori-
cally, the “old boys club” of investment bank partnerships fos-
tered exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, race, and 
religion.314 Policymakers may need to monitor the practices of 
financial industry partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives for 
troubling exclusionary practices.  Of course, investor-owned 
corporations can also engage in anticompetitive or discrimina-
tory behavior.315 
G. Reinforcing Reputational Markets from the Inside Out 
The decline of concern with firm reputation hastened the 
demise of alternative entities such as investment banking part-
nerships, and the switch to investor-owned corporations, in 
turn, further diluted the importance of firm reputation.316  The 
decline of the valuation of, and investment in, firm reputation 
had dire systemic consequences.  Jonathan Macey makes a 
compelling case that this decline contributed to waves of finan-
cial scandals and crises.317  Traditional financial regulation 
311 These restrictions survive even in investment banks that have abandoned 
the partnership form but retain some of the vestiges of partnerships. See, e.g., 
Craig, supra note 273 (“[B]ecoming a partner at Goldman Sachs is considered the 
equivalent of winning the lottery . . . [and c]andidates are judged on many quali-
ties, primarily their financial contribution to the firm.”). 
312 Saguato, supra note 7, at 649 (discussing anticompetitive concerns associ-
ated with member-owned clearinghouses). 
313 Supra notes 34, 182–83 and accompanying text. 
314 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 77–78, 89. 
315 See, e.g., Caroline Hudson, BofA Agrees to Pay $4.2M in Discrimination 
Probe, CHARLOTTE  BUSINESS  JOURNAL (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.bizjournals. 
com/charlotte/news/2019/09/30/bofa-agrees-to-pay-4-2m-in-discrimination-
probe.html [https://perma.cc/433Z-6PZ2] (discussing Bank of America’s deci-
sion to pay $4.2 million after the U.S. Department of Labor found the bank 
engaged in hiring discrimination). 
316 Supra notes 116–36 and accompanying text. 
317 JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS 
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013). 
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may prove an unwieldy tool to restore the value of reputation 
among financial firms.318 Organizational forms provide a tanta-
lizing alternative.  Instead of regulating reputation from the 
outside in, recreating older relationships among stakehold-
ers—for example, partners in an investment bank—works from 
the inside out.  The entity form provides a vessel that can re-
store the value of firm reputation.  This vessel possesses the 
governance mechanisms and incubates the institutional cul-
ture necessary for that reputation. 
CONCLUSION 
Pushing investment banks back toward partnerships, 
banks and insurance companies back toward the mutual form, 
and industrywide entities toward mutualization may promote 
important and elusive goals of financial policy.  These forms of 
remutualization may further objectives of reducing the follow-
ing: financial firm risk-taking; the probability and severity of 
financial firm failure; the systemic risk and other spillover 
costs posed by firm failure; the exploitation of consumers, cus-
tomers, and clients; and the breaking and bending of financial 
laws and the commission of other misconduct.  In short, alter-
native entities can reduce the market contracting costs of im-
portant stakeholders of the firm. 
It is important to highlight at the end of this Article the 
broader social goals that alternative entities do and do not 
promote.  At the same time, it must be underscored how many 
benefits of promoting alternative entity forms can be realized 
even if existing financial firms do not convert.  This Article ends 
by outlining several market, regulatory, and political dynamics 
that may create an opening for remutualization. 
A. “Corporate” Social Responsibility 
There are limits to what remutualization can accomplish. 
First, the benefits to remutualization outlined in this Article 
come only in traditional areas of concern for financial regula-
tion.  Investment banks as partnerships and banks and insur-
ance firms as mutually owned companies serve one or more of 
the traditional objectives of financial regulation: mitigating sys-
temic risk, protecting consumers, and promoting access to fi-
nancial services.  At first blush, it is not clear that 
remutualization would necessarily put business entities in ser-
318 Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at 400–01, 
412. 
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vice to the environmental and social goals and the wider set of 
stakeholders that were the focus of much of Lynn Stout’s schol-
arship.319  Making business entities more prosocial in these 
ways will need to wait for scholarship from others inspired by 
her work.  These scholars might explore ways to make an even 
broader set of stakeholders residual claimants of a firm. 
B. Conversion Not Required: Shifting Capital and a 
Diversified Ecosystem 
Remutualization will not prove a panacea for traditional 
objectives of financial regulation; it will not address all con-
cerns with systemic risk, market conduct and consumer pro-
tection, and consumer access.  Tax and regulatory preferences 
will not induce all investment banks to convert to partnerships 
or all banks and insurance conglomerates to mutualize.  In-
vestment bank partnerships and mutually owned banks and 
insurance firms may still take excessive risks and exploit 
customers. 
Even if not a panacea, remutualization would still make 
financial markets more stable, safer for consumers, and more 
accessible.  Part of the value of remutualization lies in the di-
versification of the universe of financial institutions.  Financial 
regulations and tax rules that favor alternative organizational 
forms may have value beyond causing investor-owned firms to 
remutualize.  Indeed, the greatest benefit of these rules may 
come in encouraging capital and customer business to flow 
away from investor-owned corporations and toward financial 
institutions organized as partnerships, mutuals, or coopera-
tives.  It might thus diminish the size of the herd of financial 
institutions taking excessive risk, exploiting consumers, or 
committing misconduct.  A more diverse ecosystem of financial 
institutions would expand the choices available to consumers 
and the competitiveness of financial services markets.  Greater 
market share for financial entities with alternative organiza-
tional forms might reduce the number of firms participating in 
future industry herding into speculative investments.  This will 
leave a larger segment of the market high and dry when the 
herd reverses and financial crisis returns.  Greater diversity 
might also reduce the number of firms seeking to bend finan-
cial laws (via regulatory arbitrage) or break them altogether and 
319 E.g., STOUT, supra note 218, at 2–4, 27–29 (outlining Stout’s attack on 
shareholder primacy and contrasting stakeholders). 
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thus relieve competitive pressure on other companies to follow 
a race-to-the-bottom. 
Diversification also allows for more experimentation and 
promotes a wider set of values.  Scholars such as sociologist 
Marc Schneiberg have made a compelling case for the benefits 
of a diverse set of organizational forms for business, including 
cooperatives.320  Schneiberg argues for promoting a resurgence 
of cooperatives to promote regulatory experimentation, create 
new markets and improve existing ones, foster competition, 
and promote sustainable economic development.321  Promoting 
cooperatives and similar organizational forms enhances local 
control of financial institutions and makes these firms more 
responsive to consumer and community needs.322 
C. Access 
Some alternative entity forms—particularly mutuals, coop-
eratives, and nonprofit banks—might expand access to credit 
and financial services for poorer communities.323  Over the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, various forms of mutually 
owned and cooperative banks also dramatically expanded ac-
cess to bank savings vehicles and bank credit.324  Indeed, ex-
panded access was one of the primary reasons that mutual 
banks, savings and loans (building and loans), and credit un-
ions were created.325 
As mutual banks and other lenders declined, so did this 
access.  The effects of the shift away from mutually owned 
banks and savings and loans on access to banking is complex. 
The existence of fewer mutually owned and cooperative finan-
cial institutions dedicated to providing access to lower income 
customers doubtless may have had a significant impact.  How-
320 E.g., Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capi-
talism? Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1409, 1422–31 (2011) (making a historical argument for the value of cooper-
atives as an organizational form of business). 
321 Id. at 1431–34. 
322 Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Diversity and Regulatory Strategy in Fi-
nancial Markets: Possibilities for Upgrading and Reform, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. J. 
141, 160–65 (2013). 
323 MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND THE  THREAT TO  DEMOCRACY 64–80, 85–90, 94–101 (2015) [hereinafter 
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS] (describing history of credit unions, sav-
ings and loan associations, building and loan (or thrift) banks, Morris banks, and 
industrial loan companies in lending to the poor). 
324 HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 259. 
325 For a history of the introduction of these different entities and how they 
promoted access to credit, see BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS, supra note 
323, at 64–80, 85–90. 
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ever, some scholars have argued that mutually owned and co-
operative lenders also deemphasized providing banking 
services to lower income customers in favor of pursuing the 
higher margins associated with a wealthier middle-class clien-
tele.326  Together, these dynamics contributed to crisis of the 
unbanked and underbanked in America lacking access to af-
fordable savings, payments, and credit products.327 
Enhanced consumer access to financial services may have 
characteristics of quasi-public goods, meaning market forces 
alone may underprovide this access.  Consumers who are un-
banked or underbanked or who lack access to credit, savings, 
insurance, and payments services at reasonable costs cannot 
fully participate in the economy and face barriers to full social 
and political participation as a result.328  This can be particu-
larly true for African American and other racial and ethnic 
communities that suffered de jure and de facto discrimina-
tion.329  Indeed, scholars have documented the gradual but 
pronounced decades-long shift of mutual banks and credit un-
ions away from serving low-margin, low income communi-
ties.330  This suggests not only that private ordering is 
insufficient to cause an optimal number of banks and insur-
ance companies to choose the mutual form for purposes of 
providing socially optimal levels of financial access, but also 
that mutual firms may need additional regulatory preferences 
or subsidies in order to provide—and have these preferences 
conditioned upon providing—financial services to low-income 
and underserved communities. 
D. A Ripe Moment for Remutualization? 
Four dynamics may make this a moment ripe for 
remutualization. 
First, an anticompetitive environment in certain financial 
markets might induce market consumers to create their own 
mutuals or cooperatives.  The largest financial conglomerates 
enjoy tremendous market power in crucial financial markets 
326 Id. at 90–94. 
327 Id.  For a germinal analysis of the problem of poor Americans lacking 
access to banking services, see Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON 
REG. 121, 134–40 (2004). 
328 See Barr, supra note 327, at 123–25 (describing the barriers preventing 
many low-income individuals from accessing the mainstream financial and the 
ramifications of that lack of access). 
329 MEHRSA  BARADARAN, THE  COLOR OF  MONEY: BLACK  BANKS AND THE  RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP 4–6 (2017). 
330 BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS supra note 323, at 146. 
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such as derivatives dealing.331  Many policymakers and schol-
ars decry restricted competition among banks and other finan-
cial institutions,332 whereas a few see it as complementary to 
goals of financial stability.333  One thing is clear: impaired com-
petition creates conditions ripe for consumer cooperatives. 
Faced with monopolistic or limited competition among produc-
ers, consumers have strong incentives to form cooperatives to 
reduce their welfare loss and create a substitute for an imper-
fect market.334 
Second, regulatory failures may undermine one of the his-
toric reasons for the rise of investor-owned corporations at the 
expense of mutual.  Looking back in history, the first compre-
hensive legal and effective federal and state regimes regulating 
banking and insurance undermined the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by mutual firms in those industries.  Bank depositors 
and insurance policyholders could then rely on regulation to 
ensure the solvency of those respective financial institutions 
and to reduce opportunism by management.  The relative im-
portance of the organizational form as a regulatory tool was 
thus diminished.335  By contrast, at this historical moment, the 
effectiveness of regulation in constraining the risk-taking of 
financial institutions remains shrouded by doubt.  Accordingly, 
the regulatory use of alternative organizational forms may be 
primed for a comeback. 
Doubts about government regulatory regimes meshes with 
a third dynamic that creates conditions ripe for remutualiza-
tion: the widespread public distrust of large banks and finan-
cial conglomerates and of corporations in general has not 
abated since the end of the global financial crisis.  The mea-
sured success of the Bank Transfer Day/Dump Your Bank Day 
movements, while not enough to alter radically the market 
share in favor of credit unions,336 does highlight the political 
331 Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial 
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 266, 277 (2012). 
332 E.g., Brett Christophers, Banking and Competition in Exceptional Times, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 563, 570–72, 574–75 (2013) (linking competition concerns to 
the “too-big-to-fail problem”). 
333 Prasad Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences of 
Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation, 35 YALE J. REG. 823, 848–52 
(2018). 
334 HANSMANN, supra note 12 at 126; RICHARD B. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND 
MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYSTEM 10–12, 25–31 (1980); Henry Hansmann, Coopera-
tive Firms in Theory and Practice, 1999 FINNISH J. BUS. ECON. 387, 389–90; Henry 
B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 889–94 (1980). 
335 Schneiberg supra note 320, at 1425–28. 
336 Goodale, supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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attractiveness of cooperatives and mutuals.  This political dy-
namic could support efforts either to restore the old tax advan-
tages and regulatory preferences enjoyed by financial 
institutions organized as mutuals or to create new ones.  It 
could also support regulatory preferences for the older, con-
servative model of investment banks as partnerships.  Social 
movements promoted earlier historical waves of mutualization 
in finance and other sectors.337  Future social movements 
could channel public antipathy toward financial conglomerates 
and corporations toward support for remutualization. 
Fourth, the current political climate might incubate a deep 
public affinity for cooperatives, mutuals, and partnerships. 
These organizational forms not only promote traditional goals 
of financial regulation, they may also reflect traditional, com-
munitarian values in which risk is mutualized and borne by 
the parties that create it, governance is shared, and a greater 
number of institutions are ultimately owned by their employees 
or the customers they serve. 
337 Marc Schneiberg, Marissa King & Thomas Smith, Social Movements and 
Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporations in the American 
Insurance, Dairy and Grain Industries, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 635, 638–42 (2008); Marc 
Schneiberg, Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Polit-
ics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 
1900–1930, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED VOL: 19, 39 (Michael 
Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002). 
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